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SALT IN THE WOUNDS: WHY ATTORNEYS SHOULD
NOT BE MANDATED REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE
ADRIENNE JENNINGS LOCKIE*
Hundreds of thousands of domestic violence victims with children fail to realize
that they subject themselves to civil and criminal liability by seeking legal
assistance such as restraining orders.' Although attorneys can provide concrete legal
remedies to domestic violence victims, they are often prevented from doing so
because of mandatory child abuse reporting laws that require attorneys to make
child abuse reports against their clients or their clients' abusive partners. Because
exposing children to domestic violence may be considered child abuse, reporting
laws may require attorneys to disclose details of their clients' own abuse even
though this disclosure conflicts with the attorneys' duties to the clients.2
This Article examines the problems with requiring attorneys to report child
abuse, specifically in the context of representing domestic violence victims.
Mandatory child abuse reporting laws present two primary harms. First, they
impede the ability of attorneys to adequately represent domestic violence victims
because they interfere with the attorney-client relationship by devaluing
confidentiality and preventing open communication.3 Second, mandatory child
abuse reporting by attorneys subjects domestic violence victims to real danger and
harm.4 Women of color and women with limited economic resources who are
victims of domestic violence are particularly harmed by mandatory child abuse
reporting by attorneys.5 Because of the detrimental consequences to domestic
violence victims, attorneys who learn about child abuse in the course of their
representation should not be required to report the abuse.
Part I of this Article explains the relationship between mandatory child abuse
reporting statutes and the professional obligations of attorneys, such as the attorney-
client privilege and the duty of confidentiality. It examines the statutes in New
Jersey to illustrate the interplay among the laws and explain the conflicts with
requiring attorneys to report child abuse. Part U demonstrates how mandatory child
abuse reporting by attorneys interferes with the attorney-client relationship. Part III
discusses the harms to the attorney-client relationship, particularly where definitions
of child abuse are ambiguous, and focuses on the issue of a child's exposure to
domestic violence. Part IV discusses the specific dangers to domestic violence
victims caused by mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys, including increased
risks of physical danger and subjection to civil and criminal liability. Part V
concludes that attorneys should not be mandated reporters of child abuse and offers
several suggestions to improve protection for domestic violence victims and their
children.
* Adrienne Lockie is the Director of the Domestic Violence Advocacy Project and Visiting Professor in
the Women's Rights Litigation Clinic, Rutgers School of Law-Newark. J.D., Georgetown University Law Center;
B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The author thanks Randi Mandelbaum, Adam Zimmerman,
Bernie Bell, and David Franklin for their editorial assistance; Michelle McBrian and Brittany Wilcox for their
invaluable and extensive research assistance; and Katherine Gallagher and Sarit Weitz for their researching skills.
1. See infra notes 133-183 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 23-63 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 133-147 and accompanying text.
5. DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 49-51 (2002).
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I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHILD ABUSE REPORTING
STATUTES AND PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF ATTORNEYS
Mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys involves the interaction of three
types of legal rules: the state statutes that require child abuse reporting, the attorney-
client privilege, and the rules of professional responsibility.6 Mandatory child abuse
reporting is a complicated issue for attorneys because these rules may conflict with
other professional obligations. Where there is a conflict, attorneys must determine
which rules take precedence in resolving that conflict. New Jersey provides an
illustrative case study of this conflict. The New Jersey child abuse reporting statute
requires everyone to report child abuse, without specifically abrogating the
attorney-client privilege.7 In addition, the statute does not clearly define the term
"child abuse," and interpretations of the scope of mandatory child abuse reporting
by attorneys are limited.8
A. Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting Statutes
Today all states have some form of child abuse reporting laws.9 Reporting laws
are premised on obligations of third parties to report child abuse with the
expectation that the state, through a child protective mechanism, will investigate
and take corrective action when needed. Typically, legislators did not craft these
laws with attorneys in mind.'
Child abuse reporting laws take many forms, from permissive to mandatory.
Approximately twenty-five states require specific persons, such as social workers,
6. Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The Reality and
the Specter of Law as Informant, 42 DuKE L.J. 203,208-09 (1992); see also Christine A. Picker, The Intersection
of Domestic Violence and Child Abuse: Ethical Considerations and Tort Issues by Attorneys Who Represent
Battered Women with Children, 12 ST. LOUiS U. PUB. L. REV. 69 (1993) (suggesting that, while attorneys in most
states are not required to report child abuse, they may be permitted to do so).
7. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-1 to -8.44 (West 1997 & Supp. 2005).
8. Id.
9. Brooke Albrandt, Note, Turning in the Client: Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting Requirements and
the Criminal Defense of Battered Women, 81 TEx. L. REV. 655, 656 (2002) (stating that there is some evidence
that mandated reporting does not significantly reduce child abuse); see also Robin A. Rosencrantz, Note, Rejecting
"HearNo Evil Speak No Evil ": Expanding the Attorney's Role in ChildAbuse Reporting, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
327, 348-49 (1995). The enactment of child abuse reporting laws grew out of the movement to recognize and end
child abuse in the 1960s. Douglas J. Besharov, The LegalAspects of Reporting Known and Suspected ChildAbuse
and Neglect, 23 VILL. L. REV. 458, 458-59 (1978) (advocating for strong mandatory child abuse reporting
statutes).
10. Ohio now largely excludes attorneys from mandatory child abuse reporting, though the statute once
included attorneys. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2002). In an abortion case
concerning parental notification from the Northern District of Ohio, the Ohio courts noted that the waiver procedure
of the judicial bypass was constitutionally defective for failing to provide confidentiality. Akron Ctr. Reprod.
Health v. Rosen, 633 F. Supp. 1123, 1144 (N.D. Ohio 1986). A minor who sought a waiver of the parental
notification laws on the basis that she was being abused would lose her confidentiality because her attorney would
be mandated to report that child abuse. Id. The child abuse statute was subsequently amended, eliminating this
constitutional issue. Akron Ctr. Reprod. Health v. Ohio, 854 F.2d 852, 866 (6th Cir. 1988), rev'don othergrounds,
497 U.S. 502 (1990). A discussion of the intersection of parental notification and mandatory child abuse reporting
is outside the scope of this Article, although it is worth noting that the purpose and effectiveness ofjudicial bypass
procedures may be undermined where attorneys are also mandatory child abuse reporters, such as in North
Carolina. For a list of parental notification and consent laws, see Center for Reproductive Rights, Restrictions on
Young Women's Access to Abortion (Nov. 2005), http://www.reproductiverights.org/pubfacrestrictions.html.
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psychologists, or physicians, to report child abuse. " Some statutes require reporting
from persons ordinarily covered by specific privileges, such as priests.12 A handful
of state statutes specifically mention attorneys either to exempt or include attorneys
in the reporting statutes, or to otherwise define the reporting responsibilities of
attorneys.' 3 Some statutes specifically abrogate the privilege while others require
11. Many state statutes require specific persons to report without mentioning attorneys. It can be assumed
that attorneys are not mandated reporters in these states. ALA. CODE § 26-14-3(a) (LexisNexis 1992 & Supp. 2005)
(mandatory reporting by specified professionals and others called upon to render aid or medical assistance to child
abuse victim); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (2004) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals including "paid
employees of domestic violence and sexual assault programs, and crisis intervention and prevention programs as
defined [by Alaska law]"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 (2004) (mandatory reporting by specified
professionals); CAL. PENALCODE § 11165.7 (West 2005) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-304 (West 2005 & Supp. 2005) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-101 (West 1998 & Supp. 2001) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals including
battered women's counselor); D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-1321.02(d) (LexisNexis 2003) (mandatory reporting by
specified professionals, not including clergy); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (2004) (mandatory reporting by specified
professionals and permitted by any person who has reasonable cause to believe that a child is abused); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 350-1.1 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2005) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals); 325 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4 (West 2001) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.69
(West 2000 & Supp. 2005) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals and permissive reporting by others);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1522 (2000) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals and permissive reporting by
others); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 (2005) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals); MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAW § 5-704 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2004) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals, not including
clergy); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 5 la (LexisNexis 2003) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.623 (West 2003) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 626.556(3) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 210.115 (2003) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals); NMSA 1978, § 32A-4-3 (2003) (mandatory
reporting by specified professionals); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03 (1999) (mandatory reporting by specified
professionals); S.C. CODEANN. § 20-7-510 (1985 & Supp. 2005) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals);
S.D. CODIIED LAWS § 26-8a-3 (1999 & Supp. 2003) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals including
employees or volunteers of shelters); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4913 (2001 & Supp. 2005) (mandatory reporting
by specified professionals); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1509 (2004) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals
including court appointed special advocates); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.030 (2005 & Supp. 2006) (mandatory
reporting by specified professionals including juvenile probation officers); W. VA. CODE § 49-6a-2 (2001)
(mandatory reporting by specified professionals); WiS. STAT. § 48.981 (2)(a)-(i-xxix) (2003) (mandatory reporting
by specified professionals and permissive reporting by attorneys).
12. For a discussion of the abrogation of clergy privileges, see Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell?
ChildAbuse Reporting Requirements Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REV
723 (1987) (explaining the origins of the clergy privilege and how it should not be abrogated lightly).
13. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-507 (2004) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals including
domestic violence shelter staffjudges, and prosecuting attorneys and abrogating any privileges); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 43-21-353 (2004) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals including attorneys); MONT. CODE ANN. §
41-3-201 (2005) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals including "a guardian ad litem or a court-
appointed advocate who is authorized to investigate a report of alleged abuse or neglect"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 202.882 (LexisNexis 2001) (mandatory reporting by all persons who know or reasonably believe child abuse
occurred); id. § 432B.220 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2003) (mandatory reporting by an attorney "unless he has
acquired the knowledge of the abuse or neglect from a client who is or may be accused of the abuse or neglect");
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 413 (McKinney 2003) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals, including district
attorneys); OHno REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2002) (mandatory reporting by specified
professionals including attorneys, but "[a]n attorney.. .is not required to make a report pursuant to.. .this section
concerning any communication.. from a client.. .in an attorney-client.. .relationship, if, in accordance with division
(A) or (B) of section 2317.02 of the Revised Code, the attorney.. .could not testify with respect to that
communication"); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.010 (mandatory reporting by any public or private official but "an
attorney is not required to make a report under this section by reason of information communicated to the attorney
in the course of representing a client if disclosure of the information would be detrimental to the client"); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 261.101 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005) (mandatory reporting by professionals who are licensed by
the state and have direct contact with children, and any "individual whose personal communications may otherwise
be privileged, including an attorney").
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reporting without explicitly abrogating privileges. 4 Approximately fifteen state
statutes require "all persons" or "everyone" to report child abuse. 5 Under each of
these reporting statutes, attorneys are required to report child abuse in some form.
New Jersey enacted its reporting statute in 1964.16 While it originally required
only reporting for physicians and hospital employees, the Act was expanded in 1971
to include all persons.' 7 The Act requires the following:
Any person having reasonable cause to believe that a child has been subjected
to child abuse or acts of child abuse shall report the same immediately to the
Division of Youth and Family Services by telephone or otherwise. Such reports,
where possible, shall contain the names and addresses of the child and his parent,
guardian, or other person having custody and control of the child and, if known,
the child's age, the nature and possible extent of the child's injuries, abuse or
maltreatment, including any evidence of previous injuries, abuse or
maltreatment, and any other information that the person believes may be helpful
with respect to the child abuse and the identity of the perpetrator. 8
Additionally, the Act provides statutory immunity to those who report child abuse. 9
14. Mississippi, for example, includes attorneys as mandated child abuse reporters without specifically
abrogating the attorney-client privilege. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (2004). Texas includes attorneys as
mandated child abuse reporters and states explicitly that there is no privilege with respect to child abuse. TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 261.101(c) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005).
15. In addition to New Jersey, the statutes that require all persons or everyone to report are the following:
ALA. CODE § 26-14-3(a) (LexisNexis 1992 & Supp. 2005) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals "or any
person called upon to render aid or medical assistance to any child" when child abuse is known or suspected); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (2003 & Supp. 2004) (mandatory reporting by specified healing arts professionals and
"any other person"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.201 (West 2003 & Supp. 2006) (mandatory reporting by specified
professionals, not including clergy, and by any person who suspects child abuse or neglect); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
16-1619 (2001) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals and "other persons" who suspect child abuse); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-33-5-1 (West 2003 & Supp. 2005) (mandatory reporting by any "individual"); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 620.030 (West 2004) (mandatory reporting by any person who knows or has reasonable cause to believe
a child is abused including specific steps that some professionals must take); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-711 (2004)
(mandatory reporting by specified professionals and other persons with reasonable cause to suspect child abuse);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (2001) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals or any other person
having reason to suspect that a child has been abused or neglected); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-301 (1999) (mandatory
reporting by any person or institution that suspects child abuse); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7103 (West 2005 &
Supp. 2006) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals and any person who suspects child abuse and
providing that no privilege relieves the reporting requirement); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6311 (2001 & Supp. 2005)
(mandatory reporting by specified professionals, not limited to the listed specific professionals, which does not
include attorneys but applies to "persons who, in the course of their employment, occupation or practice of their
profession, come into contact with children"); R.I. GEN. LAws § 40-11-3 (2005 & Supp. 2005) (mandatory
reporting by any person); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403 (2005) (mandatory reporting by any person who has
knowledge of abuse); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403 (2000) (mandatory reporting by any person); WyO. STAT.
ANN. § 14-3-205 (1999) (mandatory reporting by any person).
16. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-1 to -8.44 (West 1997 & Supp. 2005).
17. See F.A. v. W.J.F., 656 A.2d 43, 46-47 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (discussing history of statute
in finding immunity where reasonable cause found).
18. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005).
19. Id. § 9:6-8.13 (West 2002). The statute provides:
Anyone acting pursuant to this act in the making of a report under this act shall have immunity
from any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed. Any such
person shall have the same immunity with respect to testimony given in any judicial proceeding
resulting from such report.
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Failure to report abuse is punishable as a disorderly persons offense" and may
constitute evidence of negligence.2'
By requiring all persons to report child abuse, the Act appears on its face to apply
to attorneys. However, requiring attorneys to report child abuse that clients reveal
in the course of representation conflicts with the attorneys' professional obligations,
specifically the attorney-client privilege and the duty of confidentiality.
22
B. Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege, which has been given tremendous weight
historically, 23 is an evidentiary privilege that prohibits attorneys from disclosing
confidential communication between the client and the attorney. The attorney-client
privilege ordinarily applies to communications made in confidence when a client
seeks legal advice from an attorney acting in a legal capacity 24 and when the
communications relate to the purpose of the advice.25 This privilege encourages
clients to consult with attorneys freely.26 While there is some debate as to the extent
20. Id. § 9:6-8.14 ("Any person knowingly violating the provisions of this act including the failure to report
an act of child abuse having reasonable cause to believe that an act of child abuse has been committed, is a
disorderly person."). The maximum penalty for a disorderly persons offense is six months imprisonment. Id. §
2C: 1-4(c) (West 2005). It is not clear whether any attorneys in New Jersey have been prosecuted for failing to report
child abuse. Moreover, because failing to report child abuse is a disorderly persons offense in New Jersey, non-
battering parents who fail to report child abuse may also be prosecuted under section 2C:1-4(c).
In Nevada, an attorney was charged with a misdemeanor for failing to report child abuse where the
attorney waited two weeks before filing the report of suspected abuse. Sheriff of Washoe County v. Sferrazza, 766
P.2d. 896 (Nev. 1988). The Nevada Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutionally vague by requiring
professionals to make reports "immediately." id. at 897. The Nevada Legislature subsequently amended the statute
to require that a report be made within twenty-four hours. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.882 (LexisNexis 2001);
id. § 432B.220 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2003).
21. Frugis v. Bracigliano, 827 A.2d 1040, 1052 (N.J. 2003) (holding that school nurse and teachers should
have reported conduct of school principal); J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924, 934 (N.J. 1998) (deciding wife's actual
knowledge of sexual abuse of neighbor's children by husband created a duty of care to take reasonable steps to
prevent harm, whose breach was a proximate cause of the injury).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 35, 51.
23. 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2290-91 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
Wigmore contends that as a matter of social policy the soundness of this privilege has rarely been disputed.
Historically, the first duty of attorneys was to maintain the secrets of clients. Prior to the end of the eighteenth
century, the privilege developed due to a consideration for the "oath and the honor of the attorney" rather than to
encourage candid communication between attorneys and clients. Id. § 2290, at 543. However, by the end of the
eighteenth century, the justification for the attorney-client privilege focused on the importance of providing an open
forum for a client's freedom to consult with a legal advisor. Id. § 2291, at 545. Without the privilege, clients would
only share partial information with their attorneys. Id. § 2291, at 552-53. Partial disclosure of information would
limit attorneys' ability to perform their roles in the legal system and consequently undermine the ability of the
system to accomplish the interests ofjustice. Id. § 2291, at 553. For a full discussion of the history of the attorney-
client privilege, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL.
L. REV. 1061 (1978).
24. Because attorneys must be acting in their legal capacity for the attorney-client privilege to apply,
attorneys who practice in states that require everyone to report child abuse would still need to report, even if they
learn about the child abuse outside of the course of representing or advising a client or potential client. For example,
an attorney who witnesses a neighbor abusing a child would be required to report that abuse. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
9:6-1 to -8.10 (West 2002).
25. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 2991, at 554. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (stating that the privilege applies to a
communication made between privileged persons in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal assistance).
26. Ellen Marrus, Please Keep My Secret: Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, Confidentiality, and Juvenile
Delinquency, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 538-39 (1998) (arguing that the attorney-client privilege should not
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of the attorney-client privilege," it certainly applies to testimonial in-court
disclosures.28
In Upjohn Co. v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court explained the purpose
of the attorney-client privilege:
Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and
their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of
law and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal
advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends
upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client. As we stated last Term...:
"The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to
know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the
professional mission is to be carried out."
... [T]he privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice
to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to
enable him to give sound and informed advice. The first step in the resolution of
any legal problem is ascertaining the factual background and sifting through the
facts with an eye to the legally relevant.29
New Jersey courts share the underlying premise of the attorney-client privilege
stated in Upjohna0 and recognize that the privilege is based on a premise of
"preserving the sanctity of confidentiality of a client's disclosures to his attorney
[to promote] an open atmosphere of trust."'" Any privilege "reflects a societal
judgment that the need for confidentiality outweighs the need for disclosure."32 In
order for the attorney-client privilege to encourage full disclosure, there must be a
high degree of certainty that the privilege will protect the client.33 As stated in
Upjohn,
be abrogated by attorneys who represent juvenile delinquents because open communication empowers juveniles
within the system).
27. Mosteller, supra note 6, at 225. The privilege belongs to the client, but the attorney must assert it if
asked to divulge confidential information. Moreover, the privilege does not extend to communications made in the
presence of a third party. Id. at 239.
28. Id. at 224-25.
29. 449 U.S. 383, 389-91 (1981) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)) (citations
omitted).
30. As stated in United Jersey Bank v. Wolosoff, 483 A.2d 821 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (quoting
Ervesun v. Bank of N.Y., 239 A.2d 10, 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968)) (citation omitted):
The attorney-client privilege is deeply embedded in our jurisprudence and formed a part of the
common law of England prior to the birth of this country.... Where the privilege is applicable,
"it must be given as broad a scope as its rationale requires."
Nevertheless, the privilege must be anchored to its essential purpose. Our courts have thus
recognized that the privilege results in suppression of evidence and to that extent is at war with
the truth.
31. Dinter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 599 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (quoting Reardon v.
Marlayne, 416 A.2d 852, 857 (N.J. 1980)).
32. Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 691 A.2d 321, 328 (N.J. 1997).
33. Grace M. Giesel, The Legal Advice Requirement of the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Special Problem
for In-House Counsel and Outside Attorneys Representing Corporations, 48 MERCERL. REV. 1169, 1173 (1997)
(noting that the "efficacy of the privilege as an encourager of candor diminishes" where the client has doubts about
the extent of the privilege).
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[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and
client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular
discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to
be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better
than no privilege at all.'M
Although persons other than attorneys who have a privileged relationship must
often report child abuse, the attorney-client relationship is fundamentally different
in such a way that attorneys should not be mandated reporters of child abuse." The
attorney-client relationship arguably relies on confidentiality to a greater extent than
do other professions where confidentiality is important because it is an essential
component of the service provided.36 Attorneys cannot represent clients adequately
if they are required to take adverse actions against their clients. Further, in the
domestic violence context, attorneys are different from other professionals who may
also have an expectation of confidentiality because attorneys have the ability to
provide concrete assistance that will improve victim safety, such as providing legal
protection. For example, studies have shown that having an attorney is a key factor
in enabling domestic violence victims to escape the violence.37 Attorneys are often
the last resort for many clients; domestic violence victims frequently invoke the
legal system only when all else fails. Additionally, although critics of the attorney-
client privilege note that the privilege hinders access to truth, other avenues to
obtain information about suspected child abuse exist. For example, those who have
more frequent contact with children, such as schoolteachers, daycare providers, and
doctors, are typically mandated reporters of child abuse.38 The attorney-client
relationship is unique and relies upon confidentiality to carry out the purposes of
representation. Therefore, attorneys should not be subjected to the same mandatory
reporting requirements as other classes of people.
The attorney-client privilege in New Jersey is representative of the privilege in
most states. In New Jersey, the attorney-client privilege is a rule established both
34. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393.
35. Even though attorneys are different from other professionals, there is scant evidence that professionals
who are typically mandated reporters of child abuse are effective or accurate reporters of abuse. For example, in
New York City, sixty-seven percent of child abuse reports were made by mandated reporters. Fact Sheet, Kathryn
Krase, Mandated Reporting and Foster Care (June 14, 2005) (on file with author); see CrrzENS' COMM. FOR
CHILD. OF N.Y., INC., KEEPING TRACK OF NEW YORK Crry's CHILDREN: THE MuItENIUM EDITON (2003). Over
half of those reports were not substantiated upon investigation. Id. Nationwide, over half of the unsubstantiated
child abuse reports were made by mandated reporters. Id.; see ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMS., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2003 (2005), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programslcb/
pubs/cm03/.
36. For example, a doctor would still be able to perform the essential function of setting a broken leg if the
doctor reported child abuse; a priest would still be able to perform the essential function of absolution if the priest
reported child abuse. See, e.g., Thomas F. Guernsey, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Child Placement:
A Relevancy Analysis, 26 VILL. L. REv. 955, 961 (1981) (stating that "few people would avoid seeking medical
help for fear of disclosure"). Moreover, other professionals, such as doctors and therapists, are more frequently
trained in identifying child abuse and assessing the risks of future harm.
37. Amy Farmer & Jill Tiefenthaler, Explaining the Recent Decline in Domestic Violence, 21 CONTEMP.
ECON. POL'Y 158, 158-172 (2003); see also Victoria L. Holt et al., Civil Protection Orders andRisk of Subsequent
Police-Reported Violence, 288 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 589, 589-94 (2002).
38. See supra note 11.
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by statute39 and the New Jersey Rules of Evidence.' When the attorney-client
privilege is applicable, "it must be given as broad a scope as its rationale
requires."41 However, in New Jersey, the attorney-client privilege is not
absolute 42-it requires disclosure in some circumstances. 43 The attorney-client
privilege statute in New Jersey has a "crime-fraud" exception that permits the
attorney to disclose if the client uses the attorney's services to commit a crime.'
The crime-fraud exception applies when a client consults with an attorney with the
purpose of furthering a crime. The misuse of the attorney's services to assist in the
wrong-doing is key to the exception.4" However, communications relating to past
fraudulent conduct typically remain privileged.'
It is important to examine the crime-fraud exception and other exceptions to the
attorney-client privilege because an attorney may have child abuse disclosure
obligations even in the absence of reporting statutes.47 However, under the attorney-
39. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-20(l) (West 1994 & Supp. 2005) provides the following:
Subject to.. .communications between attorney and his client in the course of that relationship
and in professional confidence, are privileged, and a client has a privilege (a) to refuse to
disclose any such communication, and (b) to prevent his attorney from disclosing it, and (c) to
prevent any other witness from disclosing such communication if it came to the knowledge of
such witness (i) in the course of its transmittal between the client and the lawyer, or (ii) in a
manner not reasonably to be anticipated, or (iii) as a result of a breach of the lawyer-client
relationship, or (iv) in the course of a recognized confidential or privileged communication
between the client and such witness. The privilege shall be claimed by the lawyer unless
otherwise instructed by the client or his representative; the privilege may be claimed by the
client in person, or if incompetent or deceased, by his guardian or personal representative.
Where a corporation or association is the client having the privilege and it has been dissolved,
the privilege may be claimed by its successors, assigns or trustees in dissolution.
40. N.J. R. EvID. 504 (providing that "communications between lawyer and his client in the course of that
relationship and in professional confidence" are privileged).
41. Jersey Bank v. Wolosoff, 483 A.2d 821, 825 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 1984).
42. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that even where the privilege exists, it may be "pierced" where
there is (1) a legitimate need of the party to reach the evidence sought to be privileged, (2) a showing of relevance
and materiality, and (3) the information cannot be secured from any less intrusive source. In re Kozlov, 398 A.2d
882, 887 (N.J. 1979). It is unlikely that mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys would fall under these
exceptions because of the existence of less intrusive sources of information such as requiring other professionals
to report abuse.
43. 43 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-20(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 2005) provides:
Such privilege shall not extend (a) to a communication in the course of legal service sought or
obtained in aid of the commission of a crime or a fraud, or (b) to a communication relevant to
an issue between parties all of whom claim through the client, regardless of whether the
respective claims are by testate or intestate succession or by inter vivos transaction, or (c) to a
communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to his client, or by the client
to his lawyer.
44. Fellerman v. Bradley, 493 A.2d 1239, 1245 (N.J. 1985) ("Public policy demands that the 'fraud'
exception to the attorney-client privilege as used in [the New Jersey Evidence Rule] be given the broadest
interpretation.").
45. Mosteller, supra note 6, at 246.
46. N.J. Supreme Court Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 642 (1990), available at 1990 WL441608;
see also Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Massaro, No. 97-2022, 2000 WL 1176541, at *9 (D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2000),
aftd, 47 F. App. 618 (3d Cir. 2002).
47. If the client communicates to the attorney that the client intends to commit future acts of child abuse,
this would fall under the crime-fraud exception and would not be protected by the attorney-client privilege. Several
authors have suggested that suspicion of future acts of abuse must be reported. See, e.g., Besharov, supra note 9,
at 478.
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client privilege, it is unlikely that a situation would exist that would permit or
require disclosure of child abuse under the crime-fraud exception. For example, it
is difficult to imagine a scenario in which a client would use the services of the
attorney to commit future child abuse."a Because information about prior fraudulent
conduct remains privileged and does not fall under the crime-fraud exception,
mandatory child abuse reporting statutes that require reporting prior acts of child
abuse blatantly conflict with the attorney-client privilege. Therefore, typically any
communication about child abuse from a client to the attorney who is acting in a
professional capacity would be protected by the attorney-client privilege.
C. Duty of Confidentiality
Like the attorney-client privilege, the duty of confidentiality is an ethical rule that
is based on standards of professional responsibility 9 and is fundamental to the
attorney-client relationship.50 Mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys
conflicts with the principles underlying the duty of confidentiality.5'
The duty of confidentiality is similar to the attorney-client privilege. However,
the scope of the duty of confidentiality is broader than the attorney-client
privilege.52 The duty of confidentiality extends to all information relating to the
client regardless of the source from which it is acquired.53 For example, it covers
information gathered from third persons, which would not ordinarily be protected
by the attorney-client privilege.54 Moreover, the duty of confidentiality continues
even when outsiders discover that information.5
In New Jersey, the duty of confidentiality is set forth in Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.6, which states that "a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation,
and except as stated in paragraphs (b), (c), and (d). 56 New Jersey has one of the
48. As will be discussed in Part III, this is especially true where the issue is children witnessing domestic
violence.
49. In addition to the duty of confidentiality, other ethical rules may be implicated, such as those requiring
candor toward the tribunal and counseling against fraud. Rosencrantz, supra note 9, at 358-59 (arguing that
attorneys should be mandated reporters because child abuse is a unique crime and is distinguishable from other
crimes).
50. Mosteller, supra note 6, at 230. Mosteller supports confidentiality on the basis that it encourages full
disclosure of information.
51. The conflict between mandatory reporting and the duty of confidentiality may be more easily resolved
because ethical rules ordinarily do not supersede statutes. See id. at 240.
52. N.J. Supreme Court Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 695 (2004), available at 2004 WL 833032.
53. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Massaro, No. 97-2022,2000 WL 1176541, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2000),
aftd, 47 F. App. 618 (3d Cir. 2002).
54. RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, § 59.
55. Id. Typically the attorney-client privilege will not apply where the communication is voluntarily
conveyed to a third party. See Mosteller, supra note 6, at 239. Under the duty of confidentiality, the communication
remains confidential unless it is generally known. RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, § 59.
56. N.J. R. OF PROF'L. CONDuCr R. 1.6(a) (2005). While Rule 1.6(a) "has its roots in the attorney-client
privilege," it "represents a significant departure" from the traditional parameters of that evidentiary rule. N.J.
Supreme Court Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 677, at * 5 (1994), available at 1994 WL 586297.
Nevertheless, when the Debevoise Committee recommended the adoption of the Rules of Professional Conduct,
it determined that the protection afforded to clients by Rule 1.6(a) "represented the dominant rule of public policy
which was reflected in prior decisions of the New Jersey Supreme Court." Id.
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broadest exceptions to the duty of confidentiality and requires disclosure in a broad
range of circumstances. 7 Most notably, exceptions to the duty of confidentiality
exist for "future crimes."58 In New Jersey, the duty of confidentiality requires
disclosure when the attorney has reasonable belief59 of the existence of a future
crime or substantial bodily harm. The rule on confidentiality also contains
permissive exceptions.'
The future crime exception to the duty of confidentiality is broader than the
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege." Because the future crime
exception is broader, it presents more troubling disclosure issues for attorneys. For
example, even without mandatory child abuse reporting, attorneys would be
required to breach the duty of confidentiality when they have a reasonable belief
that there will be future child abuse. 2
Based upon the duty of confidentiality, an attorney would not be required to
disclose prior acts of child abuse. However, in New Jersey, the professional rule
permits disclosure in order to comply with other laws, such as mandatory child
57. Colin Owyang, Note, Professional Responsibility and Choice of Law: A Client-Centered Alternative
to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 459,473-75 (1995) (comparing the future
crime exceptions in New Jersey and Delaware and noting the breadth of the exceptions in New Jersey). The New
Jersey statute is also unusually broad by requiring the disclosure of future crimes by persons other than the client
and by requiring rather than permitting disclosure. See N.J. R. OF PROF'L. CoNDucT R. 1.6(b) (2005).
58. N.J. R. OF PROF'L. CONDucT R. 1.6(b)-(c) (2005) provides the following:
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information to the proper authorities, as soon as, and to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary, to prevent the client or another person:
(1) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes
is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm or substantial injury to the financial interest
or property of another;
(2) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes
is likely to perpetrate a fraud upon a tribunal.
(c) If a lawyer reveals information pursuant to RPC 1.6(b), the lawyer also may reveal the
information to the person threatened to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary
to protect that person from death, substantial bodily harm, substantial financial injury, or
substantial property loss.
59. Rule 1.6 defines "reasonable belief' as "the belief or conclusion of a reasonable lawyer that is based
upon information that has some foundation in fact and constitutes prima facie evidence of the matters referred to
in subsections (b), (c), or (d)." Id. R. 1.6(e).
60. Rule 1.6(d) states the following:
(d) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary
(1) to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal, illegal or fraudulent act in the
furtherance of which the lawyer's services had been used;
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the
lawyer and the client, or to establish a defense to a criminal charge, civil claim or disciplinary
complaint against the lawyer based upon the conduct in which the client was involved; or
(3) to comply with other law.
Id. R. 1.6(d)
61. Mosteller, supra note 6, at 246-49.
62. Even without mandatory child abuse reporting statutes, reporting future acts of child abuse is
complicated. For example, would an attorney be required to report suspected future child abuse if the attorney
knows that a batterer has been abusive to the children in the past or has been abusive to the victim in front of the
children, and the victim of domestic violence remains or returns to her abusive partner? If so, this is a particularly
troublesome conclusion given the obstacles battered women face in escaping from an abusive person. Additionally,
attorneys are typically not trained in risk assessment to determine risks of future child abuse. Moreover, reporting
future child abuse is especially problematic where definitions of child abuse are unclear, as will be discussed, infra,
in Part I1.
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abuse reporting.63 Because of this exception, attorneys who report child abuse
would not be subject to ethical sanctions. Although the rules of professional
conduct permit disclosure to comply with mandatory child abuse reporting laws,
requiring attorneys to report child abuse interferes with confidentiality, which is
necessary for effective representation of domestic violence victims.
D. Resolving the Conflict
As discussed, mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys frequently conflicts
with the attorney-client privilege and the duty of confidentiality. In states that
require "all persons" to report child abuse but do not exempt attorneys, the attorney
is left to divine the relationship between the child abuse reporting statute, the
attorney-client privilege, and the ethical guidelines to resolve a conflict when
necessary.6' Attorneys practicing in states that require everyone to report child
abuse often assume that they are mandated child abuse reporters. 65
Aside from New Jersey, fourteen other states require everyone to be reporters of
child abuse.' Do attorneys in these states consider themselves reporters, and what
guidance do they have to determine whether attorneys must report child abuse? The
answers to these questions fall into several categories. First, several states explicitly
mention privileges in the child abuse reporting statute, either to abrogate or uphold
specific privileges.67 In North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania, the reporting
statutes specifically abrogate privileges, so it is fair to assume that attorneys aremandated child abuse reporters in those states." As counter-examples, statutes in
several other states, including Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, New Hampshire, and
63. N.J. R. OF PROF'L. CONDUCT R. 1.6(d) (2005).
64. Where the legislature has passed a mandatory child abuse reporting statute that conflicts with judicially
created ethics rules, separation of powers issues may also exist. See Del. State B. Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics,
Op. 2001-1, at 7 (200 1), available at http://www.dsba.org/AssocPubs/PDFs/2001- l.pdf (stating that the judiciary
has the exclusive power to govern the Bar, and, therefore, "the Delaware Legislature, through the Child Advocate
Statute or otherwise, may not modify or abrogate the ethical obligations imposed on lawyers"); Office of the Att'y
Gen. of Neb., Op. 207, at * 7 (1982), available at 1982 Neb. AG LEXIS 39 (stating that the Nebraska Supreme
Court has the exclusive power to define and regulate the practice of law, and "any statutory attempts to cut down
upon the common law privilege of the attorney/client relationship, at least as to communications concerning the
interest of the client, would be held unconstitutional by the Nebraska Supreme Court as an invasion of the Doctrine
of Separation of Powers").
65. For example, attorneys that the author has spoken with who practice in family court in New Jersey
consider themselves to be mandated reporters. However, one could argue that the child abuse reporting statutes
should not be seen as lightly abrogating the attorney-client privilege. Mosteller, supra note 6, at 209-10.
66. See supra note 15.
67. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16, § 909 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.204 (West 2004); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 620.050(3) (LexisNexis 2001); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:32 (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-310 (1999);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7103(A)(3) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 631 1(a) (1991 & Supp.
2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-11 (1997 & Supp. 2001).
68. North Carolina abrogates the privilege "except when the knowledge or suspicion is gained by an
attorney from that attorney's client during representation only in the abuse, neglect, or dependency case." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7B-310 (1999) (emphasis added). Similarly, Oklahoma's statute provides that "no privilege or contact
shall relieve any person from the requirements of reporting." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7103(A)(3) (West 1998
& Supp. 2001). Finally, Pennsylvania's statute states:
Except with respect to confidential communications made to an ordained member of the clergy
which are protected.. .privileged communication between any professional person required to
report and the patient or client of that person shall not apply to situations involving child abuse
and shall not constitute grounds for failure to report....
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6311 (a) (1991 & Supp. 2001).
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Rhode Island, exclude attorneys from mandatory child abuse reporting require-
ments.69 Second, other states implicitly abrogate or uphold the attorney-client
privilege.7" For example, in Utah, only priests are explicitly excluded from the "all
persons" language, leading to the conclusion that attorneys are included.7' Third,
some states, including Nebraska and Wyoming, preserve the attorney-client
privilege regarding introduction of evidence of child abuse but are silent as to the
duty to report.72 It is worth noting that no cases interpreting any of the fourteen state
statutes hold that attorneys are mandated child abuse reporters.
Additionally, ethics opinions frequently fail to provide clear guidance to
attorneys though they often confirm the conflicts inherent in requiring attorneys to
69. Delaware's statute provides that "[nlo legally recognized privilege, except that between attorney and
client and that between priest and penitent in a sacramental confession, shall apply to situations involving known
or suspected child abuse ... and shall not constitute grounds for failure to report as required by § 903 of this title."
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 909 (2005). Florida's statute addresses this issue as follows:
The privileged quality of communication between husband and wife and between any
professional person and his or her patient or client, and any other privileged communication
except that between attorney and client... shall not apply to any communication involving the
perpetrator or alleged perpetrator in any situation involving known or suspected child abuse,
abandonment, or neglect and shall not constitute grounds for failure to report.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.204 (West 2004). Kentucky's statute states:
Neither the husband-wife nor any professional-client/patient privilege, except the attorney-client
and clergy-penitent privilege, shall be a ground for refusing to report under this section or for
excluding evidence regarding a dependent, neglected, or abused child or the cause thereof, in
any judicial proceedings resulting from a report pursuant to this section.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.050(3) (LexisNexis 2001). The New Hampshire statute on this point reads: "The
privileged quality of communication between husband and wife and any professional person and his patient or
client, except that between attorney and client, shall not apply to proceedings instituted pursuant to this chapter
and shall not constitute grounds for failure to report as required by this chapter." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:32
(2004). Finally, Rhode Island too abrogates all privileges except attorney-client for purposes of child abuse
reporting. R.I. GEN. LAws § 40-11-11 (1997 & Supp. 2001).
70. Idaho implicitly includes attorneys as mandated reporters since its statute provides only that "[tIhe
notification requirements [of this statute] do not apply to a duly ordained minister of religion." IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 16-1605(3) (2005). The Indiana statute abrogates privileges but does not list the attorney-client privilege among
those privileges; thus, attorneys are arguably not required to report abuse. IND. CODE § 31-32-11-1 (2004). But see
Hayes v. State, 667 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the mandatory reporting statute is absolute in a
case concerning therapist obligation to report). The Tennessee statute maintains the attorney-client privilege for
child sexual abuse but is silent as to non-sexual abuse.
The privileged quality of communication between husband and wife and between any
professional person and the professional person's patient or client, and any other privileged
communication, except that between attorney and client, as such communication relates both
to the competency of the witness and to the exclusion of confidential communications, shall not
apply to any situation involving known or suspected child sexual abuse and shall not constitute
grounds for failure to report as required by this part.
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 37-1-614 (2001).
71. UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403 (West 2004) (excluding clergymen).
72. ALA. CODE § 26-14-10 (LexisNexis 1992 & Supp. 2005) ("The doctrine of privileged communication,
with the exception of the attorney-client privilege, shall not be a ground for excluding any evidence regarding a
child's injuries or the cause thereof in any judicial proceeding resulting from a report pursuant to this chapter.");
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-714 (2005) ("The privileged communication between patient and physician, between client
and professional counselor, and between husband and wife shall not be a ground for excluding evidence in any
judicial proceeding resulting from a report."); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-210 (2004) ("Evidence regarding a child
in any judicial proceeding resulting from a report...shall not be excluded on the ground it constitutes a privileged
communication.. claimed under any provision of law other than W.S. 1- 12-101 (a)(i) (establishing attorney-client
privilege).").
[Vol. 36
MANDATED REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE
report child abuse.73 Similarly, though several bar committees and associations have
developed guidelines by attorneys who are mandated child abuse reporters,
attorneys are frequently left to their own devises to resolve the conflict.74
In sum, it is clear that attorneys must report child abuse in North Carolina (except
in pending child abuse cases), Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Utah; whereas, it
appears that attorneys would not need to report child abuse in Delaware, Kentucky,
Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Florida.75
1. Case Law Resolving the Conflict in New Jersey
In New Jersey, there are only limited interpretations of the mandatory child abuse
reporting statute. Although the statute does not state whether attorneys are
exempted from this requirement, the New Jersey courts have interpreted "any
person" to require professionals and non-professionals to report child abuse.7 6 As
73. See, e.g., Del. State B. Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 2001-1 (2001) (demonstrating that an
attorney's ethical obligations may not be modified or abrogated by the legislature); Fla. B. Ass'n Comm. on Prof I
Ethics, Op. 65-54 (1965) (stating that an attorney does not act unethically when he refuses to disclose client
information to a governmental agency if he believes it is privileged or if disclosure would be detrimental to his
client); Ky. B. Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. KBA E-360 (1993) (permitting but not requiring attorneys to report
suspected child abuse learned of through their clients); Pa. B. Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof l
Responsibility, Informal Op. 94-111 (1994) (declining to answer whether the child abuse reporting statute
supersedes the confidentiality rule of the Professional Rules of Conduct but stating that a presumption should exist
against such a supersession); Utah State B. Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 97-12 (1998) (declining to answer
whether the child abuse reporting statute supersedes the confidentiality rule of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct and stating that it is neither a violation of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct to report child abuse,
nor a violation not to report child abuse); Utah State B. Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 95-06 (1995) (declining
to answer whether an attorney is mandated to report child abuse but stating that an attorney may report child abuse
by a non-client without violating the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct); see also Office of the Att'y Gen. of the
State of Idaho, Op. 93-2 (1993) (reiterating that the statute applies to anyone who suspects child abuse but does
not specifically mention attorneys); Office of the Att'y Gen. of the State of Neb., Op. 207 (1982) (stating that any
statutory attempt to limit the attorney-client privilege in regard to communications concerning the interest of his
client would be unconstitutional).
The opinions of the North Carolina State Bar illustrate the often-confusing "advice" rendered by ethical
boards. See, e.g., N.C. State B. Ethics Comm., Op. RPC 175 (1994) (noting that, although reporting is within the
attorney's discretion, if an attorney chooses not to report where there is a mandatory child abuse reporting statute
because it would harm the client and interfere with professional obligations, doing so may subject the attorney to
criminal liability for failure to disclose); N.C. State B. Ethics Comm., Op. RPC 120 (1991) (noting that the state
statutes have not abrogated attorney-client privilege and recognizing that the ethics opinion cannot reach the legal
questions the privilege raises, but stating that an attorney may not ethically be forced to reveal child abuse). This
opinion is noteworthy because it mentions that an attorney may be prosecuted for failing to report child abuse even
though the ethics board would not find that failure to report unethical conduct. Id.
74. See, e.g., Howard Davidson, Reporting Suspicions of Child Abuse, What Must a Family Lawyer Do?,
17 FAM. ADVOC. 50 (1995) (stating that attorneys should be aware of state child abuse laws and relevant ethics
opinions); The Needs of Child. Comm. of the Young Law. Div., Attorneys andthe ChildAbuse Reporting Statute,
17 UTAH B.J. 23 (Apr. 2004) (including information on how to recognize child abuse). Attorneys who routinely
represent children may have more experience and guidance with mandated child abuse reporting, though there is
not uniformity even among those who represent children. See Bruce A. Boyer, Ethical Issues in the Representation
of Parents in Child Welfare Cases, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1621, 1632 (1996) (explaining the ethical dilemma as
it affects attorneys who represent children in abuse and neglect cases and suggesting that in child welfare cases,
the balance between reporting and duty of confidentiality should shift to reporting). See generally Linda D. Elrod,
An Analysis of the Proposed Standards of Practice for Lawyers Representing Children in Abuse and Neglect
Cases, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1999 (1996).
75. See NAT'L CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT INFO., 2003 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
STATE STATUTES SERIES STATUTES-AT-A-GLANCE: MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
(2003), available at http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/generalllegal/statutes/manda.pdf.
76. State v. Hill, 556 A.2d 1325, 1327 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989).
Winter 2006]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
the Appellate Division made clear, "any person" includes even those persons who
have an expectation of confidentiality, such as physicians and psychiatrists. 7
Nevertheless, the New Jersey courts have never specifically addressed the issue of
mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys.
In State v. Snell, the appellate division held that a psychiatrist's duty of
confidentiality to a patient was not an impediment to the obligation to report child
abuse, stating:
There is no mechanism built into the statute to relieve persons who may be privy
to confidential communications from the duty to report child abuse to DYFS
[Division of Youth and Family Services]. By mandating that "any person"
having reasonable grounds to suspect child abuse report those suspicions to
DYFS, the Legislature simply meant any person, without limitation.78
Although Snell did not involve attorney communications, the court reached this
result by expressly comparing the privilege at issue to the attorney-client privilege.79
In doing so, the court stated:
Privileges are justified in order to encourage candid and frank communication
between attorney and client.. .because of the primary concern that the client or
patient should receive informed legal advice....
... [T]he statute mandating the reporting of suspected child abuse is more
particularized and specific than are the statute and rule pertaining to confidential
relations and communications. The acute public policy behind N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10
must override the public policy supporting the psychologist privilege statute and
rule. The protection of children from injury, harm, or abuse by means of the
statutory reporting requirement may not be blocked or hindered by the assertion
of a blanket testimonial privilege....We stress that the statute requires only a
report to DYFS in order to protect the child in danger; the privilege remains
otherwise intact.80
The Court concluded that even though the psychiatrist-patient privilege was more
like the attorney-client privilege than the physician-patient privilege, the privilege
did not create an exception to mandatory child abuse reporting. Based upon the
dicta in Snell, although attorneys may not be compelled to testify against their
clients, the attorney-client privilege is trumped by the mandatory child abuse
reporting statute.8' Therefore, attorneys in New Jersey who have reasonable cause
to believe that there has been child abuse may assume that they must report that
abuse even in cases when the belief is based on information covered by the
attorney-client privilege.
77. See P.T. v. Richard Hall Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., 837 A.2d 436 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002)
(holding psychiatrist had a duty to report); State v. Snell, 714 A.2d 977, 979 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998)
(holding the same).
78. Snell, 714 A.2d at 979.
79. Id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.5 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001); N.J. R. Evil. R. 506(e) (1998).
However, the court stated that the privilege could not be completely waived because the language waives the
privilege "only as to the requirement of making an initial report to a public official." Snell, 714 A.2d at 979.
80. Snell, 714 A.2d at 980-81 (citations omitted) (finding that a psychiatrist may not be compelled by the
State to testify to the content of privileged communications).
81. Id.
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2. Ethics Opinions Resolving the Conflict in New Jersey
The ethics committee in New Jersey has not resolved the obvious conflict
between mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys and the professional
obligations of attorneys.8 2 Only one ethics case discusses the child abuse reporting
obligations of attorneys. 3 The Ethics Committee stated that, in a custody case, an
attorney is not required to report prior abuse." However, the supplement clarified
that when the attorney believes that the client's activities demonstrate the
"continued propensity" for abuse, the attorney-client privilege does not apply. 5
Neither the ethics opinion nor its supplement mentioned the mandatory child abuse
reporting statute, even though the statute had been amended to include all persons
at the time of the opinions.86 Aside from the limited guidance that these ethics
opinions offer, they are noteworthy because they demonstrate the existence of
conflicting rules and obligations and the quagmire attorneys face in trying to
ascertain their child abuse reporting obligations.
Due to limited guidance on resolving the conflict between professional
obligations and mandatory child abuse reporting laws, attorneys must frequently
draw their own conclusions.87 Uncertainty about how to resolve the conflict affects
the ability to provide effective representation. If child abuse reporting obligations
are imprecise, attorneys will not be able to provide explanations to their clients
concerning the attorneys' or the clients' responsibility to report child abuse.
Therefore, the reporting requirements interfere with the attorneys' ability to provide
one of their essential functions-advising their clients.
82. The New Jersey Ethics Committee is appointed by the New Jersey Supreme Court. See N.J. Judiciary,
Office of Attorney Ethics, http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/oae (last visited Feb. 12, 2006).
83. Opinion 280, 97 N.J.L.J. 361 (1974). The Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics held that an
attorney may not ethically reveal information about child abuse to the child abuse agency. The attorney was
representing a parent who disclosed that the parent had abused the child in the past. Id. There are no ethics cases
concerning reporting child abuse where there is a history of domestic violence.
84. Id.
85. Opinion 280 (Supp.), 97 N.J.L.J. 753 (1974). This distinction between past and future abuse seems
disingenuous where, particularly as here, the statute makes no distinction between prior and future abuse. The
Committee did say that the privilege in a custody issue is of a different character than when applied in a civil or
criminal case. Id.
86. Attorneys practicing in New Jersey could ostensibly rely on these ethics opinions in refusing to report
prior acts of child abuse. See supra notes 83-85.
87. Additionally, the assumption that child abuse reporting should take precedence over professional
obligations is based on distinguishing children as "different" and relies disproportionately on the vulnerability of
children. As several scholars have noted, framing the debate as one of children's safety versus historic notions of
confidentiality sets up an unworkable comparison, in which confidentiality will typically fail. See, e.g., Justine A.
Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child: The Error of Pursuing Battered Mothers for Failure to
Protect, 50 LOY. L. REv. 565,577 (2004). Moreover, favoring children's safety over the safety of others ignores
the harm to victims of domestic violence and ignores how children may be harmed by mandatory child abuse
reporting by attorneys. See infra notes 158-160 and accompanying text. Although it may be argued that calling
in a child abuse report to initiate an investigation is the only way to get services for the family, statistics show that
in the majority of cases, no services are offered to families. See Krase, supra note 35. Lastly, there is scant evidence
that mandatory child abuse reporting statutes have any effect on protecting children. See Albrandt, supra note 9,
at 656.
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H. MANDATORY CHILD ABUSE REPORTING BY ATTORNEYS HARMS
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
Mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys interferes with the legal practice
of all attorneys; even those who do not regularly represent domestic violence
victims will face this issue. Because of the prevalence of violence against women,"s
domestic violence surfaces in many situations other than those that are explicitly
labeled "domestic violence" cases.89 The far-reaching impact of domestic violence
indicates that attorneys who are mandated reporters of child abuse need to be aware
of the result of their obligations on their practice.
Requiring attorneys to report child abuse tramples upon the value of confiden-
tiality, which is fundamental to the attorney-client relationship.9 ° It harms that
relationship by preventing open communication and leads to the inability of clients
to be fully candid with their attorneys.9' This is a problem for domestic violence
victims because civil domestic violence attorneys typically rely on learning as much
as possible about the client's situation in order to be effective advocates.92 Limiting
the exchange of information is one of the key impediments to effective representa-
tion brought on by mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys.
Merely explaining the mandatory child abuse reporting obligations to clients
affects the development of a meaningful attorney-client relationship. For example,
domestic violence attorneys typically explain confidentiality and the mandatory
child abuse reporting requirement during an initial or early interview. Rather than
using the first meeting to build trust and rapport, the attorney uses the early
moments to explain often unclear and complicated reporting requirements. Instead
of assuring the client that the attorney is her advocate, the attorney sends the
message that the client's children are more deserving than she is of protection.
Turning attorneys into watchdogs over their clients harms the quality of the
attorney-client relationship. What domestic violence victim would have enough
trust to be completely open and honest with her attorney, knowing that the very
person she came to for help would turn her in or file a child abuse report? It is
precisely this scenario that interferes with the attorney's ability to represent her
client. 93
As a practical matter, a client whose attorney reports child abuse may lose trust
and confidence in the attorney, particularly when the client faces new obstacles as
88. An estimated three to four million American women are beaten each year by their husbands or partners.
Estimates indicate that a woman has between a one-in-three and a one-in-four chance of being physically assaulted
by a partner or ex-partner during her lifetime. ABA COMM'N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE: A LAWYER'S HANDBOOK (2d ed. 2004).
89. For example, an employment attorney may be assisting someone who was fired because of excessive
absences due to domestic violence. Id.
90. See supra Part I.B.
91. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
92. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 383 (1981).
93. The problems with mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys are exacerbated in a clinical setting
where student attorneys struggle with developing a client-centered approach to lawyering along with the challenges
of explaining confidentiality and mandatory child abuse reporting. Students frequently struggle with explaining
their professional obligations. See Clark D. Cunningham, How to Explain Confidentiality?, 9 CLINICAL L. REV.
579 (2003) (analyzing the ability of attorneys to accurately and understandably explain confidentiality to clients).
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a result of the investigation.94 The client may then want a different attorney. Given
the shortage of domestic violence attorneys and generally under-funded legal
services,95 the client may not be able to find replacement representation.96
Moreover, women of color and women with limited economic resources who are
victims of domestic violence face additional hurdles within the legal system.97 For
example, these clients are not accustomed to having their confidentiality, privacy,
or autonomy valued.98 There is a common perception that domestic violence victims
seeking legal assistance open their lives to inspection the moment they set foot into
the courthouse. 9 By intruding upon confidentiality, mandatory child abuse
reporting by attorneys is disempowering to those who most need to be empowered,
namely women of color or women with limited economic resources who are
domestic violence victims.
Ill. THE HARMS TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP ARE
EXACERBATED WHEN THE DEFINITIONS OF CHILD ABUSE
ARE NOT CLEAR
Mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys is especially problematic when
definitions of child abuse are not clear. Unclear definitions of child abuse
compromise the ability of attorneys to provide effective legal assistance to domestic
violence victims. This Part details the ways in which vague definitions of child
abuse impede the ability to adequately represent these clients. The first section uses
the New Jersey child abuse reporting statute to highlight the problems with unclear
definitions. Specifically, the imprecision of the standard that triggers the obligation
to report prevents attorneys from adequately advising their clients. The second
section shows how ambiguity concerning the impact on children of witnessing
domestic violence prevents the development of a meaningful attorney-client
relationship, which harms domestic violence victims.
A. Statutory Problems Defining Child Abuse and the Obligation to Report Child
Abuse
Mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys is further complicated because of
problems defining child abuse. Former Supreme Court Justice Stewart, in
attempting to define pornography, once said that you "know it when [you] see it.""
Similarly, there is no significant clarification on which acts are sufficient to trigger
94. See infra Part IV (discussing the disadvantages of being involved in child protection cases).
95. For example, New Jersey does not provide attorneys in domestic violence cases to indigent litigants. See
Scalchi v. Scalchi, 790 A.2d 943, 945 n. 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (stating that New Jersey only requires
appointment of counsel in civil cases involving child abuse or termination of parental rights).
96. Furthermore, mandatory child abuse reporting laws may discourage attorneys from taking domestic
violence cases when children are involved.
97. See generally ROBERTS, supra note 5.
98. Cf Christine N. Cimini et al., Kathleen A. Sullivan: A True Teacher's Teacher, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 13,
14 (2001) (explaining that clinical clients--clients who are often of the same socioeconomic status as poor women
of color-are not used to having these notions valued).
99. Cf id.
100. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("But I know it when I see it, and
the motion picture involved in this case is not that.").
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mandatory child abuse reporting.'' Because what constitutes child abuse is
frequently unclear, attorneys cannot adequately advise their clients about what must
be reported. Thus, the ability to provide effective representation is restricted when
legal definitions of child abuse are not clear." 2
In New Jersey, the definition of abuse includes "the performing of any indecent,
immoral, or unlawful act or deed, in the presence of a child, that may tend to
debauch or endanger or degrade the morals of the child."'0 3 Although the New
Jersey statute purports to define abuse, it does not explain which facts might
constitute child abuse. For example, is an open-hand slap child abuse?' ° As a result
of the vague definition of abuse, the attorney unwittingly sets a trap for the client
by assuring confidentiality and then breaching those confidences when the attorney
believes that the client's confidences reveal child abuse.0 5 An attorney's inability
101. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-8.10, -8.36 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005) (failing to define acts sufficient
to trigger reporting).
102. See supra Part I.B.
103. The complete definition of abuse is as follows:
Abuse of a child shall consist in any of the following acts: (a) disposing of the custody of a child
contrary to law; (b) employing or permitting a child to be employed in any vocation or
employment injurious to its health or dangerous to its life or limb, or contrary to the laws of this
State; (c) employing or permitting a child to be employed in any occupation, employment or
vocation dangerous to the morals of such child; (d) the habitual use by the parent or by a person
having the custody and control of a child, in the hearing of such child, of profane, indecent or
obscene language; (e) the performing of any indecent, immoral or unlawful act or deed, in the
presence of a child, that may tend to debauch or endanger or degrade the morals of the child;
(f) permitting or allowing any other person to perform any indecent, immoral or unlawful act
in the presence of the child that may tend to debauch or endanger the morals of such child; (g)
using excessive physical restraint on the child under circumstances which do not indicate that
the child's behavior is harmful to himself, others or property; or (h) in an institution as defined
in section 1 of P.L.1974, c. 119 (C. 9:6-8.21), willfully isolating the child from ordinary social
contact under circumstances which indicate emotional or social deprivation.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1 (West 2002).
Technically, only abuse and neglect must be reported under the mandatory child abuse reporting statute in New
Jersey. See id. § 9:6-1 to -8.44 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005). However, the definitions of cruelty and neglect are
included here because the language in the provisions demonstrates the overall vagueness of the child abuse statutes.
Cruelty to a child shall consist in any of the following acts: (a) inflicting unnecessarily severe
corporal punishment upon a child; (b) inflicting upon a child unnecessary suffering or pain,
either mental or physical; (c) habitually tormenting, vexing or afflicting a child; (d) any willful
act of omission or commission whereby unnecessary pain and suffering, whether mental or
physical, is caused or permitted to be inflicted on a child; (e) or exposing a child to unnecessary
hardship, fatigue or mental or physical strains that may tend to injure the health or physical or
moral well-being of such child.
Neglect of a child shall consist in any of the following acts, by anyone having the custody
or control of the child: (a) willfully falling to provide proper and sufficient food, clothing,
maintenance, regular school education as required by law, medical attendance or surgical
treatment, and a clean and proper home, or (b) failure to do or permit to be done any act
necessary for the child's physical or moral well-being. Neglect also means the continued
inappropriate placement ofa child in an institution, as defined in section I of P.L.1974, c. 119
(C. 9:6-8.21), with the knowledge that the placement has resulted and may continue to result
in harm to the child's mental or physical well-being.
Id. § 9:6-1 (West 2002).
104. This is not meant to condone the use of physical discipline. However, child protective services would
certainly be overwhelmed by reports if that type of conduct required reporting, though it might arguably fall under
the definition of cruelty in the statute. See id. § 9:6-1.
105. Mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys is particularly problematic when attorneys do not resolve
questions about their obligations in favor of their clients. For example, when attorneys report child abuse and an
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to explain the boundaries of what constitutes abuse interferes with the client's
decision making about what information to conceal or share with the attorney.
The child abuse statute in New Jersey requires reporting when there is
"reasonable cause" to believe that a child has been subjected to child abuse or acts
of child abuse. °6 No case law interprets the meaning of reasonable cause. What is
an attorney's obligation to investigate whether there is "reasonable cause"? For
example, suppose a client tells the attorney that she has been abused in front of her
children. Must the attorney ask follow-up questions to ascertain whether the
behavior constitutes child abuse? Does the attorney need to ask how frequently the
children witnessed the abuse? Does the attorney need to ask if the children were
harmed or could have been harmed?
In this situation, the civil domestic violence attorney is confronted with problems
ordinarily only faced by criminal defense attorneys.' °7 As a result of ambiguous
standards, attorneys are left without guidance both on what to report and how much
to investigate. How can the attorney advise the client when the obligations of the
attorney are not clear?'0 8 When attorneys are mandated reporters of child abuse, the
lack of clarity about what constitutes child abuse under the statute interferes with
the attorney-client relationship and harms domestic violence victims.
B. Ambiguity Concerning the Impact on Children of Witnessing Domestic
Violence
One area that demonstrates the way in which unclear definitions of child abuse
interfere with the ability to provide effective representation is the uncertainty
concerning how children who witness domestic violence are affected. Domestic
violence attorneys will likely encounter clients whose children have witnessed
investigation reveals that abuse is not substantiated, clients are harmed both by the breach of confidentiality and
by the resulting investigation. Vague standards may contribute to over-reporting of child abuse. See Krase, supra
note 35.
106. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005).
107. See, e.g., Randolph Braccialarghe, Why Were Perry Mason's Clients Always Innocent? The Criminal
Lawyer's Moral Dilemma-The Criminal Defendant Who Tells His Lawyer He Is Guilty, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 65,
72-73 (2004) (explaining the problems faced by criminal defense attorneys in deciding how much information to
extract from their client). By requiring attorneys to be mandated reporters of child abuse, the state hijacks the
attorney-client relationship to serve its own purpose. In requiring attorneys to report child abuse, attorneys act as
agents of the state, which opens possible constitutional bases to challenge the mandatory child abuse reporting
statute. Although ordinarily private actions are not subject to section 1983 claims, "a private party's actions can
be 'fairly attributable' to the state when they are compelled by state law." Thomas v. Chadwick, 274 Cal. Rptr. 128,
135 n.12 (Ct. App. 1990) (noting that because "the statutory scheme both imposes criminal liability for failure to
submit reports of known or reasonably suspected abuse, and encourages this compulsory reporting by condoning
(through immunity) certain negligent or false reports, it can be argued that the making of the report takes on the
color of state action"). In Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., the Supreme Court stated that a procedural scheme created
by the statute was "obviously.. .the product of state action. This is subject to constitutional restraints and properly
may be addressed in a § 1983 action, if the second element of the state-action requirement is met as well." 457 U.S.
922, 941 (1982). Therefore, it could be argued that mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys violates the Civil
Rights Act. But see Arline v. City of Jacksonvilie, 359 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1312-13 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding that
mandatory child abuse reporting statute did not convert a doctor into a state actor).
108. Reporting statutes like New Jersey's have additional problems, such as the failure to differentiate
between past abuse and future abuse. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-1 to -8.44 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005). Requiring
an attorney to report past abuse, particularly where there may be civil or criminal consequences for the non-abusive
parent, punishes domestic violence victims for seeking help. A full discussion of the differences between past and
future abuse is outside the scope of this Article.
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domestic violence. When attorneys are mandated reporters of child abuse, they
must consider what harms children suffer as a result of witnessing domestic
violence."°
Witnessing domestic violence certainly has some negative effect on children."'
No single theory can explain how children are affected by violence in the home." 2
Studies confirm the negative effect of witnessing domestic violence, though experts
disagree on the extent or consequences of that harm. "' Because the effect on
children of witnessing domestic violence is not typically defined, attorneys are
unable to provide accurate information about what must be reported and about the
consequences of making a child abuse report.
The debate over the extent to which children are harmed by witnessing domestic
violence has engaged not only scholars, but courts as well. For example, in
Nicholson v. Scoppetta, a federal class action brought on behalf of mothers and their
children separated because the mothers were victims of domestic violence, the
highest New York court held that witnessing domestic violence could not create a
109. Given the frequency of domestic violence cases, attorneys in domestic violence practice will encounter
children who have witnessed violence. See ABA COMM'N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 88 (illustrating the
numerous incidents of domestic violence).
110. Resolving the debate concerning the extent to which children may be harmed by witnessing domestic
violence is outside the scope of this Article. The fact that there is a national debate about the harms of witnessing
domestic violence, see infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text, demonstrates the lack of clarity about what
constitutes child abuse, which compounds the problems with requiring attorneys to report child abuse.
111. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West 2005) (emphasis added) provides the following:
The Legislature finds and declares that domestic violence is a serious crime against society; that
there are thousands of persons in this State who are regularly beaten, tortured and in some cases
even killed by their spouses or cohabitants; that a significant number of women who are
assaulted are pregnant; that victims of domestic violence come from all social and economic
backgrounds and ethnic groups; that there is a positive correlation between spousal abuse and
child abuse; and that children, even when they are not themselves physically assaulted, suffer
deep and lasting emotional effectsfrom exposure to domestic violence. It is therefore, the intent
of the Legislature to assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from
abuse the law can provide.
Although the legislative history of the New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act specifically discussed the
negative impact on children who witness domestic violence, this is not sufficient to presume harm for the purposes
of a child protective proceeding. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. S. S., 855 A.2d 8, 17 (N.J. Super. App. Div.
2004).
112. Melissa A. Trepiccione, Note, At the Crossroads of Law and Social Science: Is Charging a Battered
Mother with Failure to Protect Her Child an Acceptable Solution When Her Child Witnesses Domestic Violence?,
69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1487, 1506 (2001).
113. Social science research supports various conclusions about the effect of witnessing domestic violence.
Lois A. Weithorn, Protecting Children from Exposure to Domestic Violence: The Use and Abuse of Child
Maltreatment Statutes, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 6 n.3, 85-92 nn.372-408 (2001) (evaluating the impact of exposure
to domestic violence upon children's psychological development and functioning and concluding that children who
are exposed are more likely than non-exposed children to develop a range of psychological or emotional problems).
Weithorn argues that juvenile court jurisdiction should be expanded so that exposure to domestic violence triggers
child protection services or dependency court as long as agencies are given guidance. See also Leigh Goodmark,
From Property to Personhood: What the Legal System Should Do for Children in Family Violence Cases, 102 W.
VA. L. REV. 237, 242-52 (1999) (discussing the impact of domestic violence on children, including physical,
behavioral, and emotional harm). But see Evan Stark, The Battered Mother in the Child Protective Service
Caseload: Developing an Appropriate Response, 23 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 107 (2002) (arguing that indirect and
direct risks to children in domestic violence cases are typically non-emergent and rarely rise to the level normally
associated with abuse and neglect).
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presumption of harm to the child." 4 Nicholson challenged the removal of children
from their mothers on the basis that the mothers were victims of domestic violence
and had therefore failed to protect the children from exposure to domestic
violence." 5 These removals frequently occurred without court order, without
offering services to the victims of domestic violence, and without returning the
children to the mothers promptly, even when ordered to do so by the court." 6 The
class action in Nicholson challenged this alleged policy of the Administration for
Children's Services (ACS) under section 1983"' and several constitutional grounds,
including allegations that the removals violated substantive and procedural due
process."
8
The New York Court of Appeals found that a showing of neglect against a non-
abusive parent requires more than exposure to domestic violence; the party must
establish that a child's physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired
or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired, and the party must establish a
causal connection by showing that the harm to the child is a consequence of the
failure of the parent to exercise a minimum degree of care." 9 The court also stated
that whether a battered mother has failed to exercise a minimum degree of care is
"necessarily dependent on facts such as the severity and frequency of the violence,
114. 820 N.E.2d 840, 854 (N.Y. 2004); see also Justine A. Dunlap, The "Pitiless Double Abuse" of Battered
Mothers, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 523, 529-30 (2003) (discussing Nicholson in light of a recent
book, ELIZABErH M. SCHNEIDER, BATIERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING (2000), to show the absurdity
of charging a battered woman with failure to protect when she has sought protection for herself and her children).
115. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). The testimony of the named
plaintiffs, as summarized in the court's preliminary injunction ruling, demonstrates the perils of removing children
who have been exposed to domestic violence. For example, Sharwline Nicholson suffered a broken arm, fractured
rib, and head injuries at the hands of her boyfriend when she told him that she was ending the relationship. Id. at
169. While she was in the hospital recovering from these injuries, the children were removed from their babysitter's
home. Id. Ms. Nicholson was not informed of where her two children were being held. Subsequently, even though
Nicholson suggested several relatives with whom the children could stay, the children were placed in foster care
with strangers. Id. at 169-70. Ms. Nicholson was not permitted to return to her apartment with her children even
though the abuser had never lived with her in the apartment, did not have a key to the apartment, and lived in South
Carolina. Id. at 171. No court order was sought to remove the children and a petition was not filed until five days
after the children's removal. Ms. Nicholson had previously been denied an order of protection due to problems with
serving the abuser. Id. Her children were not returned until twenty-one days later, after the children had been
mistreated in foster care. Id. at 172. Although the petition was ultimately dismissed, Ms. Nicholson remained on
the state's registry as a neglectful parent because the neglect report "indicated" her to be one. Id. at 173.
116. Id. at 168-93.
117. Id. at 232-33.
118. Nicholson has a long procedural history. In January of 2001, the district court granted a preliminary
injunction prohibiting ACS from carrying out ex parte removals of children or filing neglect petitions solely
because the mother was the victim of domestic violence. In re Nicholson, 181 F. Supp. 2d 182 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
On appeal, rather than address the substantial federal constitutional issues, the Second Circuit certified several
questions of state law to the New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court. In October 2004, the court of
appeals answered the certified questions and found that a parent may not be presumed neglectful for exposing a
child to domestic violence. Nicholson v. Scopetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 849 (N.Y. 2004). In December 2004, the
federal case settled. As part of the Nicholson settlement, ACS agreed to abide by the principles set out by the New
York Court of Appeals. Leslie Kaufman, Abuse Victims and the City Settle Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2004,
at B1. ACS established a system to handle any complaints alleging that they were not complying with the
guidelines established by the New York Court of Appeals. Id.; see Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 116 F. App. 313 (2d
Cir. 2004); Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003); Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153
(E.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Nicholson, 2001 WL 1661707 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2001), rev'd, In re Nicholson, 181 F.
Supp. 2d 182 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2004); Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 807
N.E.2d 283 (N.Y. 2003).
119. Nicholson v Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 845 (N.Y. 2004).
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and the resources and options available to her."'12 The court expressly recognized
that factors to consider included the risks of leaving, whether or not the batterer
threatened to kill the victim if the victim leaves, and the risks of seeking
governmental assistance, criminal prosecution, or relocation.' 2 '
New Jersey courts have followed the ruling in Nicholson.122 For example, a
domestic violence victim in New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v.
S. S., suffered at the hands of her husband who choked her, pulled her hair,
attempted to punch her, and threatened to kill her. Some of this violence occurred
in the presence of their two-year-old child. 23 After a child abuse report was filed,
the child was placed with relatives of the mother, who was not allowed
unsupervised visitation with her child. 124
Despite testimony that the child was not harmed, the trial judge ruled that the
mother's conduct in allowing her child to witness domestic violence constituted
abuse. 25 The appellate division reversed, finding that the emotional harm of
witnessing domestic violence cannot be presumed in the absence of evidence of its
existence or potential harm. 126 The appellate division overturned the finding of
abuse, stating that none of the caseworkers, review boards, or judges were entitled
to assume that witnessing domestic violence caused emotional harm, but instead
that DYFS must demonstrate harm to the particular child.127
120. Id. at 846.
121. Id. The New York Court of Appeals made several findings concerning removals, most notably that
"when a court orders removal, particularized evidence must exist to justify that determination, including, where
appropriate, evidence of efforts made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal and the impact of removal on
the child." Id. at 854. Emergency removals without court order, though theoretically permissible, exist for only the
"rare circumstance" when the danger is great and time is fleeting. Id. Finally, the court of appeals affirmed that
"there can be no 'blanket presumption' favoring removal when a child witnesses domestic violence." Id.
122. Most recently in Division of Youth and Family Services v. D.F., 871 A.2d 699 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2005), the appellate division held that the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) could not bring an
administrative action to place a mother's name on the Central Registry for falling to protect herself and her six-
month-old child from domestic violence. Id. at 706-07. The victim obtained a final restraining order after the most
recent incident of violence. Id. at 701. This case is also noteworthy because it shows how poorly domestic violence
victims may be treated in the child protection system. The only action taken by DYFS was this administrative
action against the child's mother, and the only result was limiting her employment opportunities. Id. at 700. Nojudicial action was taken against the abuser. Id. The court noted that it was "troubled by the fact that a person's
name may be placed in the Central Registry based solely on a determination by an individual caseworker," which
raises procedural due process and administrative fairness concerns. Id. at 704 n.2.
123. 855 A.2d 8, 10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). The police reported the matter to DYFS. When the
mother inquired about reducing the defendant's bail, a DYFS case-worker threatened to remove her child. Id. at
11.
124. Id. at 11.
125. Id. at 13.
126. Id. at 16.
127. The New Jersey court referenced Nicholson by noting the following:
In District Court Judge Jack Weinstein's decision underlying his finding of constitutional
violations, Judge Weinstein summarized evidence of a wide divergence among experts as to the
effects of domestic violence on children, and concluded that "the children can be-but are not
necessarily-negatively affected by witnessing domestic violence."
We thus cannot assume (as did DYFS and the family court judge) that the present case was
one in which witnessing domestic abuse had a present or potential negative effect on the child
sufficient to warrant a finding of abuse against appellant-the battered victim. The assumption
is particularly troubling in light of its substantial potential effect upon appellant's reputation and
to her employment prospects.
Id. at 16 (citations omitted).
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Nicholson and S. S. demonstrate that at least some courts are moving away from
the idea of punishing abused mothers for the acts of their abusive partners.
Furthermore, these cases provide some guidance to mandated reporters of child
abuse about what must be reported. However, questions regarding the specific legal
consequences of witnessing domestic violence in child abuse and neglect cases
remain unanswered in many states. These unanswered questions exacerbate the
problems inherent in requiring attorneys to be mandated reporters of child abuse. 128
Though Nicholson seems to be unique in specifically addressing the
constitutional issues involved in removing children on the basis that the mothers
were victims of domestic violence, other state cases have discussed the issue of
witnessing domestic violence, most notably in the custody context. 129 A handful of
states have codified the harmful effects of witnessing domestic violence. 3'
Not only are Nicholson and S. S. clear victories for domestic violence victims,
they also highlight the national debate concerning the impact of witnessing
domestic violence. Even after cases like Nicholson and S. S., attorneys who are
mandated reporters of child abuse must still consider the effect of witnessing abuse
in individual circumstances. For example, although Nicholson and S. S. state that
harm to a child who witnesses domestic violence cannot be presumed,3' circum-
stances may exist where a child has been harmed by witnessing violence such that
child abuse should be reported.'32 When a client tells an attorney in confidence that
the client's child has suffered emotional harm as a result of witnessing domestic
128. See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155, 164, 166 (N.D. 1995) (taking judicial notice of legislative
findings that any domestic violence, even if it is not witnessed by the child, negatively affects the best interest of
the child and reversing custody determination to abusive parent).
130. For example, the child neglect statutes in Alaska, Florida, and Montana all state that exposure to
domestic violence constitutes neglect. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-102(23)(a) (2005) (stating that
.'[psychological abuse or neglect' means severe maltreatment through acts or omissions that are injurious to the
client's emotional, intellectual, or psychological capacity to function, including the commission of acts of violence
against another person residing in the child's home"). Fortunately, attorneys in these states are typically not
mandated reporters of child abuse. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-3(a) (LexisNexis 1992 & Supp. 2005) (mandatory
reporting by specified professionals and others who are called upon to render aid or medical assistance to child
abuse victim); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020(a)(6) (2004) (mandatory reporting by specified professionals, including
"paid employees of domestic violence and sexual assault programs, and crisis intervention and prevention programs
as defined in [Alaska law]"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.204 (West 2004) ("[Any.. .privileged communication except
that between attorney and client... shall not apply to any communication involving the perpetrator or alleged
perpetrator in any situation involving known or suspected child abuse, abandonment, or neglect and shall not
constitute grounds for failure to report...."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201(2)(i) (2005) (mandatory reporting by
specified professionals, including "a guardian ad litem or a court-appointed advocate who is authorized to
investigate a report of alleged abuse or neglect"). Although Minnesota defined exposure to domestic violence as
reportable child abuse in 1999, that law was subsequently repealed. Dunlap, supra note 87. "Allowing" exposure
to domestic violence may also constitute a criminal offense. Jeffrey L. Edleson, Should Childhood Exposure to
Adult Domestic Violence Be Defined as Child Maltreatment Under the Law?, in PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: STRATEGIES FOR COMMUNTrY INTERVENTION 8, 17 (Peter G. Jaffe et al. eds., 2004); see,
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-70(a)(1) (2005) (including allowing a child to witness domestic violence in the
definition of the crime of cruelty to children); Nat'l Clearinghouse on Child Abuse & Neglect Info., State Statutes
Series 2004, Children and Domestic Violence (2004), available at http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/generalllegall
statutes/domviol.cfm.
131. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. S. S., 855 A.2d 8, 17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); see
Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 847 (N.Y. 2004).
132. Where a child abuse report is required, it should typically be against the batterer. However, even where
a child abuse report is against the batterer, negative consequences exist for the victim of domestic violence. See
infra notes 138-145 and accompanying text.
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violence, the attorney must at least consider whether to make a child abuse report.
When it is unclear whether witnessing domestic violence constitutes child abuse,
there is a detrimental effect on the attorney-client relationship.
Whenever it is not clear what legally constitutes child abuse, the attorney-client
relationship may be harmed. The relationship is harmed because attorneys who are
mandated reporters encounter difficulties explaining the reporting requirement and
properly advising their clients. This is particularly true when the definitions of child
abuse are vague, when the standard to trigger an attorney's obligations is vague, and
when the effect on children of witnessing domestic violence is uncertain.
IV. DANGER OF MANDATORY CHILD ABUSE REPORTING BY
ATTORNEYS TO VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
THEIR CHILDREN
Mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys has severe consequences for
victims of domestic violence, including increasing the physical danger to victims
and their children, subjecting domestic violence victims to ongoing state interven-
tion and potential criminal prosecution for abuse or neglect, and discouraging
victims of domestic violence from seeking legal assistance."' These negative
consequences exist even when the child abuse report is filed against someone other
than the victim of domestic violence.'34
This Article's primary objection to mandatory child abuse reporting is that it is
dangerous for domestic violence victims and their children. It is commonly accepted
that the most dangerous time for a domestic violence victim is the point at which the
victim attempts to leave or otherwise end the relationship.'35 Attorneys should not
be responsible for increasing this danger to their clients. Reporting child abuse leads
to an investigation, which could further enrage the batterer and subject the domestic
133. These harms of mandatory child abuse reporting arise regardless of who makes the child abuse report.
Those in favor of mandatory child abuse reporting frequently fail to consider how it affects victims of domestic
violence. See Nancy E. Stuart, Note, Child Abuse Reporting: A Challenge to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 1
GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 243, 261-66 (1987) (arguing attorneys should be mandatory reporters of child abuse without
discussing domestic violence). Domestic violence advocates may rightfully oppose mandatory child abuse reporting
foranyone, especially where the child protection system fails to appropriately treat domestic violence victims. This
Article supposes that attorneys should not be mandated reporters in part because of problems within the child
protection bureaucracies. Where domestic violence victims will face obstacles as a result of mandatory child abuse
reporting by anyone, attorneys are needed to guide victims through the child protection system. Attorneys cannot
effectively provide legal assistance to their clients involved in the child protection system if attorneys are also
charged with reporting suspected child abuse.
134. When the client is the child abuser, mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys is still problematic.
One wonders how an attorney would be able to represent a parent accused of abuse at all, especially when there
is a risk that the client will disclose previous uncharged acts of child abuse. In these instances, mandatory child
abuse reporting by attorneys may interfere with the right to counsel, raising constitutional concerns. As one New
Jersey court stated, "Ithe attorney-client privilege is basic to a relation of trust and confidence that, though not
given express constitutional security, is yet essentially interrelated with the specific constitutional guaranties of the
individual's right to counsel and immunity from self-incrimination." State v. Kociolek, 129 A.2d 417, 425 (N.J.
1957); see also United States v. DiDomenico, 78 F.3d 294, 299-300 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that undermining
freedom of communication between defendants and attorneys limits efficacy of the right to counsel).
135. See State v. Reyes, 796 A.2d 879, 884 (N.J. 2002) ("Often victims are at greatest risk when they leave
their abuser because the violence may escalate as the abuser attempts to prevent the victim's escape."); Martha R.
Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 65-71
(1991).
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violence victim and her children to further harm.' 36 If the attorney makes a child
abuse report, the client may discharge the attorney or discontinue the legal matter
because the client has lost trust in the attorney and the legal system. By requiring
attorneys to report child abuse, society abandons domestic violence victims when
they are most vulnerable.'37
Even when the child abuse report is against the batterer, the domestic violence
victim will unquestionably be involved in the child protection system. Child
protection cases often last for many years, subjecting the domestic violence victim
to ongoing state intervention and supervision. Frequent court appearances may
place the client's job in jeopardy, which exacts an uneven toll on women of color
and women with limited economic resources. 138 Moreover, child protection cases
are frequently tracked via the mother's name even when the mother is not a party
to the action. '39 As a result, significant detriments to employment opportunities and
earning potential for women whose children are involved in the child protection
system arise."4 For example, the domestic violence victim may be prohibited from
working in the school system or a daycare center, or otherwise working with
children, a frequent employment opportunity for women.' 4' This is particularly
troubling because lack of access to financial resources often results in a victim
remaining with her batterer; conversely, a victim's increase in income often reduces
domestic violence. 42 Attorneys should not be required to report child abuse because
reporting the abuse has such detrimental consequences for their clients.
Even as a non-battering parent, the domestic violence victim may be subject to
criminal liability. 43 Reporting abuse does not immunize a client from criminal
prosecution, especially if the client is charged with endangering the welfare of a
child or is charged as an accomplice.'" For example, in New Jersey, the immunity
provision in the child abuse reporting statute applies only to reporting and not to the
underlying act or conduct.'45 A domestic violence victim who reports child abuse,
or whose attorney reports child abuse, risks being criminally prosecuted. A client
seeking civil legal assistance should not be subjected to criminal sanctions as a
result of the attorney's mandatory child abuse reporting obligations.
136. For example, she may be called to testify against the batterer in court, which could jeopardize her safety.
137. Martha A. Fineman, Domestic Violence, Custody, and Visitation, 36 FAM. LQ. 211,213 (2002) (citing
Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women's Lives, Violence, andAgency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE
OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 79 (Martha Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994)) (stating that "separation is often the
most dangerous time for a woman").
138. See generally ROBERTS, supra note 5.
139. For example, New York tracks child protection cases by the mother's name, even if she is not the
suspected child abuser. There are proposals pending to change this practice.
140. Removing a name from the registry often requires further court action. See Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs.
v. D. F., 871 A.2d 699 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
141. Inclusion in the registry limits employment as a day care worker and in other education-related jobs.
Inclusion in the registry also limits service as a foster parent and the ability to adopt. See In re Allegations of Sexual
Abuse at E. Park High Sch., 714 A.2d 339, 346 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
142. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-4 (West 2005) (endangering welfare of a child); id. § 2C:2-6.c(c)
(liability for conduct of another; complicity).
144. Id. § 2C:2-6.c(c) (defining accomplice).
145. In State v. Hill, a mother who reported to the police that her daughter was abused by the mother's
boyfriend was not entitled to immunity from prosecution for endangering the welfare of her child. 556 A.2d 1325,
1326 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989).
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In addition to criminal liability, mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys
also exposes domestic violence victims to civil sanctions, such as an abuse or
neglect charge of "failure to protect."' 46 Civil liability for victims of domestic
violence should not be instigated by their attorneys.1
47
The risk of failure to protect cases is particularly high where what constitutes
child abuse is not clearly defined, such as the ambiguities concerning the impact of
witnessing domestic violence. The problems with failure to protect cases for
domestic violence victims include the following: encouraging unnecessary removal
of children from their parents and placing children in foster care, taking
responsibility away from the batterer, and perpetuating stereotypes about domestic
violence victims.
48
As demonstrated in Nicholson, the child protection institutional response to
children witnessing domestic violence has not focused on stopping the violent
perpetrator. Instead, the child protection response has focused on separating
caretakers from their children in failure to protect cases.'49 As a result of failure to
protect cases, children may be removed from their non-abusive parent and placed
in foster case. A child who faces removal may be subjected to ongoing abuse in the
foster care system, 150 and the harms of removing children from the non-abusive
parent are well documented. 151 Misapplication of the failure to protect doctrine
causes domestic violence victims, particularly women of color and women with
limited economic resources, to lose custody of their children. 152 Courts frequently
rely on false assumptions that a domestic violence victim is capable of preventing
the abuse or preventing the child from witnessing abuse, such as by taking the child
146. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1 (West 2002) (referencing "allowing any other person" to "endanger
the child" or "any willful act of omission").
147. Failure to protect cases have been written about extensively. See, e.g.,The "Failure to Protect" Working
Group of Child Welfare Comm. of N.Y. City Inter-agency Task Force Against Domestic Violence, Charging
Battered Mothers with "Failure to Protect": Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 849 (2000). This
Part of the Article is an overview of the issues and a discussion of how failure to protect cases intersect with the
problems of mandated child abuse reporting by attorneys. A thorough discussion of the problems of failure to
protect cases is outside the scope of this Article.
148. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
149. Susan Vivian Mangold, Transgressing the Border Between Protection and Empowermentfor Domestic
Violence Victims and Older Children: Empowerment as Protection in the Foster Care System, 36 NEw ENG. L.
REv. 69, 127 (2001) (offering ideas of renewed investment and creative permanency planning to empower both
caretakers and children).
150. There are numerous potential harms for children placed in foster care, including neglect, physical abuse,
sexual abuse, emotional abuse, and psychological harm. Research suggests that once a child is placed in foster
care, the child may not be safer from harm than when the child was with the abusive parent. The failure of foster
care systems to follow minimum standards of care that may otherwise ensure care and protection of children has
led to increased rates of foster care abuse and neglect. See Emily Buss, Parents' Rights and Parents Wronged, 57
OHIO ST. L.J. 431, 439 (1996) (stating that the child welfare system plays out abysmally for children, often
exposing them to neglect, physical, and/or sexual abuse); Randi Mandelbaum, Revisiting the Question of Whether
Young Children in Child Protection Proceedings Should Be Represented by Lawyers, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1,
15-19 (2000) (discussing the deficiencies of the child welfare system); Shana Gruskin, Advocate Sues State Foster
Care, Children Put at Risk, Suit Contends, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), June 15, 2000, at l B (reporting
a state class action filed on behalf of over 14,000 children in the Florida child welfare system, alleging sexual
abuse, beatings, malnutrition, torture, and neglect). See generally Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case
for Constitutional Protection of Foster Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 199 (1988).
151. Stark, supra note 113 (noting that children in domestic violence situations are particularly vulnerable
to the trauma associated with foster placement).
152. See generally ROBERTS, supra note 5.
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away, removing the abuser from the home, or otherwise separating the child from
the abuser.'53 In practice, police, child protective services, and members of the
community are frequently unsupportive and unresponsive to domestic violence
victims who attempt to end their victimization.'54 Failure to protect cases that lead
to removal are harmful not only during the immediate removal, but also because of
the time that it takes to get rightful custody back.'55 These profound harms to the
family should not be caused by domestic violence victims' attorneys.
Failure to protect cases also deemphasize the responsibility of the batterers and
fail to hold the correct party accountable. Batterers, rather than non-abusive parents,
should be prosecuted.' 56 Society should be holding the batterers accountable rather
than blaming domestic violence victims for failing to protect themselves and their
children.5 7 Additionally, failure to protect cases assume that domestic violence
victims have done nothing to protect their children. Domestic violence victims may,
in fact, have a very accurate sense of when batterers are most likely to inflict
violence upon them and may have taken steps to protect their children. Bringing a
case against the non-abusive parent necessarily downplays the role and responsi-
bility of the abusive party.
Child protection cases against non-abusive mothers based on the failure to
protect doctrine also perpetuate stereotypes about battered women. These cases
presume that the child's safety is paramount to the mother's safety.'58 However, a
child's safety is typically inextricably linked to the mother's safety.'59 By favoring
the child's safety at the expense of the mother's safety, failure to protect cases
perpetuate the idea of the self-sacrificing mother."6 Motherhood holds a powerful
ideology in our culture and "is critical to women's subordination" '61 because the
identity of "woman" is often shaped by the identity of "mother." Mothers are
153. V. Paulani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws' Failure to Protect Battered Women and
Abused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 229 (1996). Although the awareness of domestic violence has increased
over the years, a victim of domestic violence is still subject to societal norms that question why she did not leave.
For a discussion of the many barriers to leaving an abusive relationship, see Sarah Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving,
a.k.a., Why Abuse Victims Stay, COLO. LAW., Oct. 1999, at 19.
154. Enos, supra note 153, at 250.
155. Peggy Cooper Davis & Gautum Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentiality,
and the Law, 2 U. CH. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 139, 145-46, 157 (1995) (documenting the "sequentiality effect" of
how decisions made at one stage of a child protective proceeding are likely to influence decisions at the next stage
and that interim decisions are more likely to err on the side of intervention).
156. Audrey E. Stone & Rebecca J. Fialk, Criminalizing the Exposure of Children to Family Violence:
Breaking the Cycle of Abuse, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 205 (1997). Significant debate exists concerning the role
of criminal prosecution of domestic violence cases and related policies, such as mandatory arrest; however, that
discussion is outside the scope of this Article.
157. See Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and the Confirmation
Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283 (1992) (positing that questioning why victims do not leave directs attention
away from batterers).
158. See, e.g., FAM. VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, ADVOCACY MATrERS: HELPING MOTHERS AND THEIR
CHILDREN INVOLVED WITH THE CHILD PROTECTION SYSTEM (2003), available at http://endabuse.org/programs/
children/files/Advocacy.pdf (stating that any scheme that necessarily harms the mother will fail).
159. Id.
160. Odeana R. Neal, Myths and Moms: Images of Women and Termination of Parental Rights, 5 KANS. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 61, 74 n.75 (1995) (stating that what constitutes a good mother is tied to what constitutes a good
woman). Good mothers are altruistic and self-sacrificing, and a mother who is viewed as "bad" by a judge may
often lose custody of her children even when there has not been a demonstrated risk of harm to the child. Id.
161. SCHNEIDER, supra note 114, at 149, 152, 178.
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expected to place their needs second to those of their children.'62 Society often
blames mothers for the problems faced by children, while fathers are not as often
subjected to a similar "good" versus "bad" dichotomy.' 63
For example, the facts of Nicholson demonstrate that the named plaintiff was a
victim of stereotyping and illustrate the biases against victims of domestic violence
in the child protection system." First, the child protection agents presumed that,
as a victim of domestic violence, Ms. Nicholson could not care for her children.'65
Her autonomy and her ability to assess the risks to herself and her children were
neither considered nor valued.' 66 Moreover, the system repeatedly failed her; she
sought legal assistance and attempted to obtain a restraining order, but these
attempts were ignored. 67 Ms. Nicholson was charged with neglect based on the
assumption that she was as equally culpable as her batterer and that she failed to
live up to the expectations of motherhood.
68
Because Ms. Nicholson was an African-American woman, the case also
demonstrated how stereotypes about domestic violence victims are exacerbated by
class and race stereotypes. 69 Race biases are particularly troublesome because
African-American children are disproportionately represented in the child
protection system. 7 ° Scholars, most notably Dorothy Roberts, have pointed out that
the child welfare system has systematically dismantled the African-American
family."' Stereotypes about women who "expose" their children to domestic
violence or child abuse ignore the very real obstacles that domestic violence victims
face when seeking to protect their children, such as the absence of social and legal
support for leaving their abusers. 172 The legal system propagates stereotypes about
162. Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE LJ. 274, 284, 291. As
Professor Fineman notes, mothers are classified in their relation to men; "single" mothers are the "bad" mothers
and the ones who are abused.
163. Mary E. Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive Families: Social Support Systems, Custody
Outcomes, and Liability for Acts of Others, 2 U. CHI. L SCH. ROUNDTABLE 13, 15-16 (1995). Although a
discussion of abusive mothers is outside the scope of this Article, feminists have struggled with how to treat the
"bad mothers." See Marie Ashe & Naomi Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN
&L. 75 (1993) (arguing that feminists need to have a theory to address "bad mothers"); Naomi Cahn & Joan Meier,
Domestic Violence and Feminist Jurisprudence: Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 339 (1995) (calling
for new theories that reflect, among others, the complexities of the needs and interests of children with respect to
their battered and battering parents); Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look at Psychological Parent
Theory, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 347, 365-66 (1996).
164. See Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 168-73 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
165. Id. at 170-71.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 171.
168. Id.
169. Becker, supra note 163, at 16.
170. Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 171,172 (2003) (stating that
child welfare should be viewed as a civil rights issue because of its effect on African-American families); see
Dennette Derezotes, Fam. Violence Prevention Fund, Examining Child Maltreatment and the Impact of Race in
Receipt of Child Welfare Services in the United States, http://endabuse.org/programs/children/files/prevention/
ChildWelfareResearch.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2006). Because of racial inequalities in the child protection system,
African-American families are disproportionately harmed by mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys.
171. See generally ROBERTS, supra note 5. See Annette Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers:
Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577 (1997).
172. Becker, supra note 163, at 17.
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women by how it treats victims of domestic violence.' 73 Both the child protection
arena and the domestic violence arena are "'mother-blaming' institutions where
fathers are absent and larger social forces are virtually invisible." '74 Failure to
protect cases perpetuate stereotypes about the "good mother" by blaming battered
women for the harms perpetrated by abusive men.'75 Because of the harms to
domestic violence victims and their children in failure to protect cases, attorneys
who are mandated to report child abuse rightfully fear that they will do harm to their
client by reporting abuse.
Domestic violence victims are also harmed by mandatory child abuse reporting
by attorneys because attorneys cannot provide sufficient advice when their clients
face civil or criminal sanctions. 7 6 Domestic violence victims, particularly women
of color, have historically been treated poorly within the child protection system.'77
An attorney who is required to report child abuse can offer no assurances that a
client's case will be handled uniformly, fairly, efficiently, or effectively by child
protection services. For example, in New Jersey, the child protection agency,
DYFS, has limited protocols for handling domestic violence issues.'7 8
Moreover, requiring attorneys to report child abuse ignores the ongoing presence
of the batterer in the child's life and the hurdles a domestic violence victim faces
in future or ongoing custody and visitation disputes. In many jurisdictions, parents'
rights to visitation or "parenting time" can only be eliminated in extreme
situations. 79 Therefore, a domestic violence victim will be forever tied to the
child's other parent even if that parent has been abusive and even if that abuse
occurred in the presence of the child. The client who reports an abusive partner will
frequently be required to interact with the abuser, to take the child or children to
visit the abuser, and to discuss parenting decisions with the abuser.
173. Bernardine Dohrn, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers, and the State: Children on the Margins, 2 U. C1. L.
ROuNDTABLE 1 (1995) (pointing out the invisibility of children in domestic violence cases, the silencing of women
in juvenile cases, and the fragmented systems of both).
174. Id. at 5-7. Dohm also notes that juvenile courts come from a misogynist tradition that punished deviant
mothers who were poor, single, and who worked outside the home. Id.
175. See Becker, supra note 163.
176. See supra Part II.
177. See generally ROBERTS, supra note 5.
178. See generally Child & Fam. Servs. Rev., Domestic Violence Work Group, Protecting New Jersey's
Children and Families from Domestic Violence (Nov. 2003),
http://www.state.nj.us/humanservices/Reports/Domestic%2oViolence/CFSR-WorkgroupReport%20Final_%20-
%20Domestic%20Violencel.pdf. In New Jersey, DYFS has been working with domestic violence providers for
a numberof years. However, a comprehensive policy for addressing domestic violence in the child welfare caseload
was not approved until January 2003. Id. at 25. In November 2003, as part of the impending transformation of the
child welfare system, members of the child and family services review domestic violence working group
recommended increased coordination between the courts, child protection and domestic violence advocates,
specialized domestic violence training, consideration of safety of adults and children, and batterer accountability.
This report recognizes that DYFS should adopt a "family-centered" practice and sets forth a roadmap for such a
plan. It acknowledges that the DYFS assessment process focuses on the "needs of the child in isolation of the non-
offending parent." Id. at 14. As New Jersey grapples with an overhaul of its child welfare system, it remains to be
seen whether DYFS will be able to carry out the aforementioned recommendations. See also GOVERNOR'S BLUE
RIBBON PANELON CHILD PROT. SERVS., FINAL REPORT (1998), available at http://www.state.nj.us/humanservices/
dyfs/blue%20ribbon/BRRTOC.html.
179. See, e.g., Cosme v. Figueroa, 609 A.2d 523 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992) (stating visitation is a
fundamental right).
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Additionally, experience shows that judges do not understand the dynamics of
domestic violence and rarely consider domestic violence outside the context of
restraining order hearings.180 Requiring domestic violence victims to "protect" their
children is not realistic in a system that favors parental equality. 81 Domestic
violence victims with children face an unworkable dilemma: they are required to
leave their abusers to protect their children, yet they are prohibited from interfering
with the abuser's parental rights.182 These consequences for domestic violence
victims are troubling no matter who initiates the child abuse investigation and
should not be initiated by domestic violence victims' attorneys.
The numerous harms detailed above have a chilling effect on domestic violence
victims who are seeking legal assistance. Mandatory child abuse reporting by
attorneys discourages domestic violence victims from seeking legal assistance
because domestic violence victims know that attorneys must report suspected child
abuse.183
In almost all regards, requiring attorneys to be mandated reporters of child abuse
is harmful to domestic violence victims and their children. Although domestic
violence victims with children often need the most legal assistance, mandatory child
abuse reporting laws punish domestic violence victims seeking help. 184 Attorneys
cannot be expected to provide meaningful representation to domestic violence
victims while at the same time being responsible for increasing the danger to their
clients and subjecting their clients to civil sanctions or criminal prosecution.
V. SOLUTIONS
This Article has explained how mandatory child abuse reporting compromises
the attorney-client relationship and is dangerous and harmful to domestic violence
victims and their children. Because of the problems inherent in requiring attorneys
to report child abuse, attorneys should not be mandatory reporters.
Where attorneys are explicitly mandated reporters of child abuse, several
suggestions have been made to improve child abuse reporting statutes or the legal
system.'85 Some of these suggestions lack merit while others are worth considering.
Two proposals in particular may exacerbate problems for domestic violence
victims. First, at least one author has suggested that attorneys should be appointed
to represent children in all domestic violence cases. 86 This is problematic, however,
because of the difficulty with finding and paying appointed attorneys for children
180. Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding Judicial
Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 657 (2003) (explaining the barriers
in recognizing domestic violence in custody cases).
181. Id. at 676-81.
182. Martha A. Fineman, Fatherhood, Feminism, and Family Law, 32 McGEORGE L. REv. 1031, 1034
(2001) (arguing that gender neutrality in family law, where there is an existing unequal distribution of labor and
sacrifice, further disadvantages women and children).
183. See supra Part U.
184. See supra notes 133-157 and accompanying text.
185. However, these improvements should complement but not replace the need to exempt attorneys from
mandatory child abuse reporting.
186. Picker, supra note 6, at 109.
[Vol. 36
MANDATED REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE
and because this may needlessly and increasingly complicate a case.'87 It is easy to
envision a domestic violence case where there is simply no need to appoint an
attorney for the children. 8' Moreover, this suggestion adds to the overall
assumption that litigants in the family court system, who are typically women of
color or poor women,'89 subject their lives to never-ending scrutiny upon entering
family court. 9° Requiring children to be represented in a straight-forward
restraining order case needlessly prolongs the process, tramples on the privacy of
litigants, implicitly presumes harm to children exposed to domestic violence, and
reinforces mother-blaming. 9' Furthermore, appointing an attorney for the child does
nothing to address the harms to the attorney-client relationship and the harms of
mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys on domestic violence victims.
Another potential response to the ambiguities of mandatory child abuse reporting
laws is to clarify the child abuse reporting statutes. The child abuse definitions
could be more clear and specific. 192 For example, statutes could be amended to
include a clearer definition of the effect of witnessing domestic violence on
children. However, statutory changes will not eliminate many of the problems with
mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys, such as infringing upon confiden-
tiality, preventing open communication, discouraging clients from seeking legal
assistance, and increasing the physical danger to domestic violence victims and their
children. Because domestic violence victims are harmed by mandatory child abuse
reporting by attorneys, even when it is clear that there has been child abuse, clearer
statutes, though certainly an improvement, will not solve the problems.' 93
Other improvements within the legal domestic violence and child protection
court systems offer more promise in assisting domestic violence victims while
protecting their children. Any such improvements should include client
counseling, 94 client empowerment, 19 and improved coordination between child
187. Children who are themselves victims of child abuse would obviously be entitled to representation.
188. For example, a child whose mother seeks a restraining order where there has been no physical violence
and whose father neither lives with the family nor seeks visitation would have no need for an attorney.
189. See generally ROBERTS, supra note 5.
190. See Cimini et al., supra note 98.
191. See supra notes 158-175.
192. For example, in New Jersey, one improvement would be to change the reporting statute to require
reporting only for future harm rather than for past harm. However, attorneys are not trained in assessing risk or in
determining the likelihood of future abuse.
193. Efforts to clarify the abuse statutes also run the risk that the revised statutes will define abuse in ways
that are harmful to domestic violence victims such as including witnessing domestic violence as part of the
definition for per se child abuse.
194. Through client counseling, attorneys can work with their clients to develop safety plans for the victims
and their children. Short of requiring reporting, attorneys can take an active role in enabling domestic violence
victims to protect their children. Certainly circumstances exist where attorneys may encourage or even require their
clients to report child abuse. Even when attorneys are mandated reporters of child abuse, it is certainly preferable
to give the client notice and the opportunity to report rather than having the attorney make the report. Additionally,
attorneys who are not mandatory child abuse reporters but who collaborate with social workers who are mandatory
child abuse reporters have been faced with the dilemma of reporting and developing responses. See, e.g., Jacqueline
St. Joan, Building Bridges, Building Walls: Collaboration Between Lawyers and Social Workers in a Domestic
Violence Clinic andIssues of Client Confidentiality, 7 CuNICALL. REv. 403 (2001) (arguing for interdisciplinary
collaboration by social workers and attorneys and maintaining that the conflict between a social worker's duty to
report and an attorney's duty of confidentiality can be addressed by a confidentiality wall that would protect
confidential disclosures by a client to their attorney).
195. Empowerment has been described as:
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protection workers and domestic violence advocates. 196 Rather than blaming
domestic violence victims for not leaving, the legal system should be giving
domestic violence victims with children the tools required to achieve safety and
self-sufficiency. 97 Collaborative projects should make services available to
domestic violence victims, including assistance with relocation, welfare, education,
safety planning, and counseling98 One collaborative solution to the problems of
both child abuse and domestic violence is to explore the strengths and weaknesses
[A] theory and practice that deals with issues of power, powerlessness, and oppression and how
they contribute to individual, family, or community problems and affect relationships.. .[and]
consists of the following subprocesses: development of group consciousness, reduction of self-
blame, assumption of personal responsibility for change, and enhancement of self-efficacy.
Lorraine M. Gutierrez et al., Understanding Empowerment Practice: Building on Practitioner-Based Knowledge,
76 FAMS. IN Soc'Y 534 (1995); see also Mangold, supra note 149, at 104 (offering renewed investment and
creative permanency planning to empower both caretakers and children). One key problem with mandatory child
abuse reporting is that it takes away the agency of the client. Its blatant paternalism removes all decision-making
power from the victim. This is not the way to empower victims, particularly where such forced decision making
has proven to be harmful. Empowerment strategies must not be blind to the role of race and class in shaping
responses to violence. See Donna Coker, Shifting Powerfor Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor
Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1009-11 (2000).
196. See LINDA SPEARS, NAT'L RESOURCE CTR. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ET AL., BUILDING BRIDGES
BETWEEN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ORGANIZATIONS AND CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES (2000), available at
http://www.vawnet.org/NRCDVPubications/BCSDV/Papers/BCS7_cps.pdf; Janet Carter & Susan Schechter, Fam.
Violence Prevention Fund, Child Abuse and Domestic Violence: Creating Community Partnerships for Safe
Families: Suggested Components of an Effective Child Welfare Response to Domestic Violence (Nov. 1997),
http://www.mincava.umn.edu/link/documents/fvpfl/fvpfl.shtml; see also Randy H. Magen et al., Domestic
Violence in Child Preventative Services: Results from an Intake Screening Questionnaire, 22 CHILD. & YOUTH
SERVS. REV. 251, 251-74 (2000) (finding that women who went through training had enhanced identification
skills, appreciated being asked about present and past incidents of domestic violence, and felt safer after disclosing
incidents of domestic violence): Mangold, supra note 149, at 104 (arguing that protection and empowerment of
both caretakers and older children are complementary goals for families with multiple forms of violence and that
protection of children via removal should only be an extreme remedy necessary when efforts at supporting the non-
offending parent have failed); Linda Mills, Child Protection andDomestic Violence: Training, Practice and Policy
Issues, 22 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 315, 315-32 (2000) (exploring the connection between child abuse and
domestic violence and the tension between battered women, their advocates, and child protective services workers);
Laudan Y. Aron & Krista K. Olson, Urban Inst., Efforts by Child Welfare Agencies to Address Domestic Violence:
The Experiences of Five Communities (Mar. 1997), available at http://www.urban.org/publicationsl406798.html
(identifying the need for child protective services, domestic violence service providers, law enforcement officials,
and other service providers to work together and co-educate each other in order to develop a system that can
address the needs of families that are affected by multiple forms of violence).
197. Many of these solutions are premised on attorneys following models of "problem-solving," which may
not be practiced by all domestic violence attorneys. See, e.g., ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH,
INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION (1990); DAVID A.
BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (2d ed. 2004). Moreover, even where
attorneys embrace problem solving, the limitations of civil domestic violence remedies reduce the ability of
attorneys to provide effective legal assistance. For example, in some states, restraining orders last for a very limited
time. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (McKinney 2004) (providing for two-year orders and orders for up to five
years when "aggravating circumstances" exist). For an explanation of the remedies that are available in some states,
see Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State
Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801 (1993). Where the civil legal remedies may not provide an
adequate ability to terminate an abusive relationship or provide adequate protection, domestic violence victims are
harmed even more by mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys.
198. See Meier, supra note 180, at 718; SPEARS, supra note 196, at 17 (stating that child safety "can often"
be improved by helping the mother).
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of a unified domestic violence and child protection court.'99 Principles of
therapeutic jurisprudence may be especially helpful in this context.2°
Though improvements to the court systems may assist domestic violence victims,
the only solution to the problems brought on by mandatory child abuse reporting by
attorneys is to exclude attorneys from mandatory child abuse reporting
requirements. In states where child abuse reporting statutes list specific
professionals that are required to report but do not list attorneys, no further action
is needed.20' However, attorneys or legislators in the remaining states should
consider taking corrective action to explicitly exempt attorneys from mandatory
child abuse reporting statutes. As mentioned previously, several states specifically
include attorneys as mandatory child abuse reporters, at least in some manner.20 2
199. It is worth noting that unified family courts (UFCs) may be even more problematic where some
participants, such as prosecutors or social workers, are mandated child abuse reporters. See, e.g., James W.
Bozzomo & Gregory Scolieri, A Survey of Unified Family Courts: An Assessment of Different Jurisdictional
Models, 42 FAm. CT. REV. 12 (2004) (surveying UFCs and finding that they are better able to address the family's
long-term needs, as well as the problems of the individual litigants, than traditional, fragmented family court
systems); Deborah J. Chase, Pro Se Justice and Unified Family Courts, 37 FAm. L.Q. 403 (2003) (describing
effective pro se programs as having significant cost benefits for courts and arguing that a UFC would further the
objectives of existing pro se programs and provide better access to justice for pro se litigants); Deborah Epstein,
Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court
System, 11 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 3 (1999) (advocating for the creation of integrated, specialized domestic violence
courts that can provide comprehensive responses to family violence); Mark Hardin, Child Protection Cases in a
Unified Family Court, 32 FAM. LQ. 147 (1998) (citing the ability of the courts to understand and consider issues
important to child protection litigation, including custody, child support, guardianship, domestic violence, and
adoption as a significant advantage of UFCs in child protection litigation); Andrew Schepard & James W.
Bozzomo, Efficiency, Therapeutic Justice, Mediation, and Evaluation: Reflections on a Survey of Unified Family
Courts, 37 FAM. L.Q. 333 (2003) (discussing the evolution of UFCs utilizing the results of a multi-state survey,
which finds that many states are moving vigorously in the direction of creating a single court for family problems
and assigning a single judge to a single family); Carolyn D. Schwarz, A Saving Grace for Victims of Domestic
Violence Living in Nations with Fragmented Court Systems, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 304 (2004) (arguing in support of
UFCs in order to provide victims of domestic violence with the orders and services they need, as well as prevent
conflicting orders from being issued). But see Billie Lee Dunford-Jackson et al., Unified Family Courts: How Will
They Serve Victims of Domestic Violence?, 32 FAm. L.Q. 131 (1998) (questioning the willingness of UFCs to
adjust theirjurisprudential goals and methods for victims of domestic violence, citing alternative dispute resolution
as one example of a method that could be used to further victimize the victim of domestic violence rather than
achieve the therapeutic goals of UFCs); Anne H. Geraghty & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Unified Family Courts:
Tempering Enthusiasm With Caution, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 435 (2002) (suggesting that there is scant evidence to
show that a unified family court can produce better results than current functioning courts of general jurisdiction).
200. "Therapeutic jurisprudence" investigates the law's impact on the emotional lives of participants in the
legal system. BRUCE J. WINICK & DAVID B. WEXLER, JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS (2003) (describing the newly emerging problem-solving courts, such as drug
treatment courts and domestic violence courts, and how judges can encourage offender compliance with release
conditions and serve as effective risk managers); BRUCE J. WINICK & DAVID B. WEXLER, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC
KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996) (discussing the application of therapeutic
jurisprudence to issues such as domestic violence, family, and juvenile law); Barbara A. Babb, Fashioning an
Interdisciplinary Frameworkfor Court Reform in Family Law: A Blueprint to Construct a Unified Family Court,
71 S. CAL. L. REV. 469 (1998); Susan L. Brooks & Dorothy E. Roberts, Social Justice and Family Court Reform,
40 FAM. CT. REV. 453 (2002); Randal B. Fritzler & Leonor M.J. Simon, Creating a Domestic Violence Court:
Combat in the Trenches, 37 FAM. CT. REV. 28 (2000) (discussing the advantages of a domestic violence court that
was developed on principles of therapeutic jurisprudence, preventive law, and restorative justice, with the joint
goals of holding the batterer accountable, ensuring the safety of the victims, and providing satisfaction to the
victims when dealing with the justice system); David Rottman & Pamela Casey, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
the Emergence ofProblem-Solving Courts, NAT'LINST. OFJUST. J. 13 (1999) (advocating for court and community
collaboration to better address community-wide problems in the aggregate, such as domestic violence).
201. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
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Attorneys in those states should lobby for legislative changes to exempt attorneys
from the mandatory child abuse reporting statutes. The most difficult states to tackle
are those in which everyone is required to report child abuse. In states in which the
attorney-client privilege has not been explicitly abrogated by statute, attorneys are
entitled to assume that they are not obligated to report child abuse that they learn
about in the course of their representation when it conflicts with their professional
obligations.2 °3 Alternatively, attorneys in those states could seek guidance from
courts, bar associations, and ethics committees about resolving the conflict between
the professional obligations of the attorney and the mandatory child abuse reporting
requirements. Attorneys in states where everyone is required to report child abuse
could also seek legislative change to specifically exempt attorneys from the
mandatory child abuse reporting statutes. Another avenue of change is to consider
bringing legal challenges to statutes in states where attorneys are either explicitly
or implicitly mandated reporters of child abuse.2" Additionally, attorneys who are
prosecuted for failing to report could challenge the reporting statutes on due process
grounds. °5
203. See Mosteller, supra note 6, at 223, 236.
204. A review of the state statutes shows that only the Nevada child abuse reporting statute has been
challenged by an attorney. This challenge did not raise any issues with the attorney-client privilege because the
Nevada statute does not require that an attorney make a report if the knowledge is acquired from a client who may
be accused of abuse or neglect. See Sheriff of Washoe County v. Sferrazza, 766 P.2d. 896 (Nev. 1988) (charging
attorney with a misdemeanor for failing to report child abuse after the attorney waited two weeks before filing the
report of suspected abuse). None of the other state statutes that either implicitly or explicitly require attorneys to
report child abuse appears to have been challenged by attorneys. However, several state cases contain language that
recognizes the problems of requiring mandated child abuse reporting when it conflicts with privileges. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Spencer, 108 P.3d 1189, 1194 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding but criticizing the
abrogation of the psychotherapist-patient privilege for its chilling effect on those seeking help); Rodriquez v. State,
No. 05-95-01356-CR, 1997 WL 527843, at *7 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 1997) (stating that "[tihere is no attorney-
client privilege that applies to reporting but the privilege does apply in a child abuse proceeding where an attorney
might be called to testify" and declining to address any Sixth Amendment issue).
Numerous grounds for challenges to mandatory reporting statutes exist. For example, the compulsory
speech required by mandatory child abuse reporting statutes raises First Amendment issues and could be challenged
on those grounds. But see State v. Grover, 437 N.W.2d 60,66 (Minn. 1989) (holding that mandatory child abuse
reporting obligation poses no First Amendment violation); White v. State, 50 S.W.3d 31, 47-48 (Tex. Ct. App.
2001) (holding the same). When a reporting statute requires, compels, or prohibits expression of a specific
ideological view, it may rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Cf. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S.
533, 546 (2001) (noting that a restriction on attorney's speech by restricting funding is "even more problematic
because in cases where the attorney withdraws from a representation, [an indigent] client is unlikely to find other
counsel"). Additionally, requirements for mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys could be challenged for
violating the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel or for violating the protections against self-
incrimination in the Fifth Amendment. See supra note 134.
205. It is a crime in several states to fail to report suspected child abuse. See, e.g., supra note 20 and
accompanying text. These statutes may violate due process where they do not give fair notice of the conduct that
is criminally protected. Where the definitions of reasonable cause or child abuse are not clear, defendants who are
prosecuted may claim that the statutes are unconstitutionally vague. For example, the Nevada Supreme Court struck
down the reporting statute that required "immediate" reports but did not define "a reason to believe" that abuse
occurred. Sheriff of Washoe County, 766 P.2d. at 897. The Nevada Supreme Court reasoned as follows:
The statute does not attempt to define the type of knowledge that might satisfy that standard,
nor does the statute leave any room for investigation and the exercise of professional judgment.
If, for example, a professional person, in the course of counseling a client, is told that an abuse
has taken place, it could be argued that the professional had "a reason to believe" an abuse has
occurred and was therefore under a duty to report the alleged abuse even though, based on his
or her experience, observation of the demeanor of the complainant, and professional judgment,
the professional person believes the report to be untrue and unreasonable. If this construction
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VI. CONCLUSION
Mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys limits the ability of attorneys to
provide effective representation to domestic violence victims by interfering with the
attorney-client relationship. Mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys also
subjects domestic violence victims to severe negative consequences, particularly to
women of color and women with limited economic resources. Where definitions of
child abuse are ambiguous, notably in the area of the effect of witnessing domestic
violence, mandatory child abuse reporting by attorneys further jeopardizes the
ability to provide meaningful representation to domestic violence victims and
compromises the safety of domestic violence victims. Because of the harms to the
attorney-client relationship and the risks to domestic violence victims and their
children, attorneys should not be mandated reporters of child abuse.
were accorded the statute, then the professional would be forced to report the alleged abuse, or
run the risk that a prosecutor, with the aid of hind sight, might second guess the professional's
judgment and charge him or her with a serious criminal offense. However, in light of our
conclusion that [the statute] is unconstitutionally vague, we need not now consider such other
concerns which are raised by placing professionals under burdens that may conflict with their
duties to behave in a responsible manner.
Id. But see White, 50 S.W.3d at 47-48 (holding that the reporting statute provided clear enough standards of what
constitutes child abuse in a case where the non-attorney defendant was convicted for failure to report).
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